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FICTIONS, FAULT, AND FORGIVENESS:
JURY NULLIFICATION IN A NEW CONTEXT
David N. Dorfman•
Chris K. lijima ••
Recently, critics of the Anglo-American jury system have complained that juries in criminal trials have been ignoring the law,
in favor of defendants who claim that they lack criminal responsibility because they are affiicted by the various victimization
syndromes now popularized in the mass media. In this Article, Professors Dorfman and Iijima counter this characterization of the
"runaway" jury and argue that juries are not ignoring the law, but
rather, are exercising a primary power of the jury, to nullify the
application of the law when such application to a particular defendant is unjust. The Authors trace the development of the jury
nullification power from its beginnings in the late seventeenth
century to the present. The Authors then counter the standard
arguments against jury nullification. Finally, the Authors propose
an explicit jury nullification instruction and accommodating
adjustments to other trial procedures that would solve the deficiencies of the current manner in which juries exercise their
nullification power.

INTRODUCTION

Coincident with this country's political swing to the right, the
popular call to redefine the American character has assumed
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an increasingly retributive tone. 1 For those who seek to
recharacterize the national psyche and return to the virtues of
·"traditional American values"-rugged individualism, selfsufficiency, and national machismo-much evidence for our
dwindling moral character is found in the American jury.
Recent newspaper articles, 2 Op-Ed pieces, 3 television news
magazines,4 and pundits of every stripe have been decrying the
modern jury, the "runaway jury," the jury that has been "giving
away the store," the jury that has been buying"no responsibility" defenses from clever attorneys. 5
There is indeed· something going on. Certain communities
and contemporary juries are taking a firmer stand against
what they perceive to be the excesses of the criminal justice
system than did their counterparts of thirty or forty years ago.
However, much of what is going on is hardly new-it has been
known historically as jury nullification, the exercise of jury
power to disregard the judge's instructions on the law. What
does seem new is the way juries are nullifying the law. Rather
than directly rejecting unpopular penal law, they take exception to other well-established parts of the judge's instructions,
such as the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
punishment as solely within the province of the judge, interested witness and witness credibility,jury sympathy, bias, and
· prejudice. Even this kind of jury independence is neither
unprecedented nor a contemporary phenomenon; it is simply
1.
See, e.g., CHARLES J. SYKES, A NATION OF VICTIMS: THE DECAY OF THE AMERICAN
CHARACTER 241 (1992) (positing that American society has "emphasized rights over
responsibilities, refused to hold individuals accountable for their own behavior, and
made a national industry out of the manufacture and elaboration of grievance").
Hidden beneath Sykes' call for a return to old-fashioned "character" lies the equally
old-fashioned and disquieting assumption that the condition of the poor and disenfranchised "stems less from 'the absence of opportunity than from the inability or
reluctance to take advantage of opportunity.' "Id. at 237 (quoting Lawrence M. Mead,
The New Politics of the New Pouerty, 103 PuB. INTEREST 3, 3 (1991)).
2.
See, e.g., Margot Slade, At the Bar, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1994, at B20 (discussing examples of defenses created by attorneys to portray their clients as victims).
3.
See, e.g., Trial by Jury, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 8, 1992, at 20 (suggesting
explanations for the Rodney King verdicts).
4.
See generally Eye to Eye (CBS television broadcast, May 26, 1994) (considering
the Menendez brothers and Damian Williams cases in terms of social responsibility)
(transcript on file with the Uniuersity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
5.
See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWIT'l, THE ABUSE EXCUSE (1994) (describing various
tactics by which defendants claim a history of abuse as an excuse for violent retaliation); Sophfronia S. Gregory, Oprah! Oprah in the Court!, TIME, June 6, 1994, at 30
(attributing the trend of juries to consider mitigating circumstances, once deemed
irrelevant, in part to the public's exposure to themes of abuse on television talk
shows).
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more widely experienced by the public through increased media
coverage.
In the past, scholars andjudges have parsed the issue of jury
nullification, considering real nullification to be the jury's
rejection of the penal law under which the defendant is
charged. The jury's independent view of other factors, namely
the standard of proof, witness credibility, and sympathy, was
not seen as an issue of nullification but rather as the inscrutable and unpredictable result of lay fact-finding. 6 In other
words, the jury's nullification of the judge's charge on the penal
law was an endeavor into an issue of "law," doctrinally the
province of the judge, while the jury's independent view of the
standard of proof, of witness credibility, prejudice, and sympathy was properly within its "fact-finding" province.
This traditional distinction between the jury that disregards
a penal instruction and the jury that practices more subtle
dynamics is a direct result of the history of jury nullification
itself. The notion that the jury might acquit defendants "in the
teeth of both law and facts" 7 has been deeply rooted in AngloAmerican law. Thematically, the foundational jury nullification
cases have been political cases involving the prosecution of
crimes of conscience against the government or the prevailing
social order. 8 Because of the preponderance of cases in the
literature, the jury nullification debate has been characterized
, by an analysis peculiar to these cases, that is, the dynamic of
a legally guilty defendant being acquitted because of the jury's
rejection of an unpopular law or an oppressive government or
the jury's embrace of the position of conscience held by the
accused.

6.
See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 116, 149
(1966); see also discussion infra Part 11.B (detailing the findings of the Kalven and
Zeise! jury nullification study).
7.
Homing v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135; 138 (1920).
8.
See Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L.
REV. 168, 191 n.85 (1972). Scheflin defines "political trials" as including
(1) any trial which will have political repercussions ifthe defendant is convicted;
(2) prosecutions of technically criminal activity when the state's motive is to
suppress political opposition; (3) prosecutions where the state has fabricated a
case on traditional criminal grounds but [where) the primary motive ... is to
silence a member of a political minority; and (4) trials involving political offenses
such as treason . . . .

Id.
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The modern jury nullification debate has centered around
furnishing nullification instructions from the bench in "conscience cases."9 Because of this particular focus, the parallel
phenomenon of acquittal has been downplayed. This Article
attempts to synthesize these two phenomena-the disregard
of penal instructions and the disregard of judicial instructions
of general applicability-under the rubric of jury nullification.
Such analysis offers more than semantic and conceptual value.
By changing this conceptual framework, one may re-examine
the bases and merits of an explicit nullification instruction,
particularly in the context of the "ordinary" criminal trial.
We make several assertions. First, jury nullification in the
ordinary criminal trial is a common, and perhaps increasing,
phenomenon because nullification often occurs by means other
than the jury's failure to adhere faithfully to the elements of
the substantive law as charged. Nullification also occurs when
the jury disregards oth~r instructions such as the consideration
of punishment or the elimination of bias. In this way, nullification is often accomplished by the jury's conscious or subconscious focus on fictions, that is, on collateral issues which act
as surrogates for the jury's true discomfort with the propriety
of the conviction itself. As such, jury deliberation may focus on
the reliability of evidence or on the credibility of witnesses
when in actuality there is no real dispute about it among jury
members. Jurors, trying to be faithful to the court's instructions, deliberate around false issues oflaw or fact because the
underlying issues of justice or mercy are, by the judge's proscription, out of bounds. As a result, substantive elements of
the crime, particularly mens rea requirements, may be distorted or misstated, or the burden of persuasion may be heightened
well beyond the applicable standard, in order for the jury to

9.
See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(deciding that although jury nullification serves as a "necessary counter to casehardened judges and arbitrary prosecutors," the jury does not have to be informed of
this option, even in civil disobedience cases) (citation omitted); United States v.
Dellinger, 4 72 F.2d 340, 408 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that the court trying the Chicago
Seven should only instruct the jury to apply the law), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973);
United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 519 (9th Cir. 1972) (refusing to permit an
instruction to the jury that it may acquit regardless of evidence of guilt); United
States v. Boardman, 419 F.2d 110, 116 (1st Cir. 1969) (holding that the court should
instruct the jury that although it has the power to ignore the law, the jury's duty is
to apply the law as interpreted by the court), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1970); United
States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1006 (4th Cir. 1969) (holding that the jury should
not be told that it can decide the case according to conscience), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
910 (1970).
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reach a verdict that it can tolerate. This manner of deliberation
may lead to acquittal verdicts, but not for the reasons expressly
agreed upon inside the jury room or even for the reasons which
the jurors themselves believe they had for the acquittal.
Second, we assert that jury nullification is best understood
as a community's check on judicial, prosecutorial, and police
discretion. In communities where the population does not trust
government and is estranged economically, culturally, or
racially from it, nullification in the ordinary criminal trial
becomes an inchoate political act that challenges the legitimacy
of government itself. Jury nullification is one of the few ways
through which a community can challenge the "power structure" with an immediate impact.
Third, we argue that an explicit and carefully crafted nullification charge would officially recognize the nullification
phenomena that already exists and which may be increasing
in frequency. Such a charge would not necessarily encourage
additional nullification, but would instead directly address it
as it happens. Moreover, such a charge would transform the
judicial process by providing a more rational basis for jury
deliberation and decision making. In particular, it would allow
jury deliberation to be an open process in which extrajudicial
biases are aired and confronted. 1°Further, those communities
whose members are increasingly estranged from the criminal
justice system's decision-making process will benefit indirectly
from greater participation and, in turn, from power over the
kinds of cases prosecuted. 11 In sum, contrary to the argument
that a nullification charge is an invitation to anarchy, 12 such
a charge could help to control the anarchy that has already
gripped much of the system.
This Article attempts to give some perspective on critics'
concern over the effectiveness and fairness of the jury system
by discussing the nullification phenomenon in a societal

10. The concept of extrajudicial concerns is somewhat problematic given our
premise that issues outside the substantive elements of a crime may be relevant to
a jury's determination of guilt or innocence and therefore by definition are not extralegal. Nevertheless, we use extrajudicial as a term of convenience to indicate those
matters which are outside the usual purview of the jury in a criminal case.
11. A fundamental premise of this Article, that nullification serves as a community check on governmental power, assumes that the composition of juries adequately
represents minorities. To the extent that such representation is not yet a reality,
judicial reform must proceed on other fronts, of which a nullification instruction is
but one. These other fronts are beyond the scope of this Article.
12. E.g., Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1114; Moylan, 417 F.2d at 1009.
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context. Part I examines the historical background behind jury
nullification and its relationship to the conscience cases, which
have in turn dictated the terms of the jurisprudential discussion. Part II explores the types of nullification that occur when
juries focus on collateral issues as surrogates for their desire
to nullify. In particular, we will attempt to reconcile the
proliferation of state-of-mind defenses, including spousal abuse
syndrome, urban survival syndrome, and the increasing acquittal rates seen in particular crimes in certain communities, with
the inability of juries to bring extrajudicial concerns into
deliberation. Part III discusses why the traditional arguments
against jury nullification instructions do not confront contemporary social issues and why the traditional "right versus
power" framework of the discussion is appropriate only in the
context of crimes of conscience. Additionally, Part III examines
how a nullification instruction would provide a community with
a check upon the discretion of law enforcement and prosecution. Part IV is a description and critique of actual nullification
instructions and of some proposed in the literature. In particular, we examine these instructions from the standpoint that
they should adequately rationalize the deliberation process
such that the fact-finding of the jury is not confused with
nullification sentiment.
Finally, Part V presents some suggestions for a nullification
instruction and a framework for how to resolve some of the
practical issues that an explicit instruction would raise, particularly how to balance jury empowerment with efficient
criminal procedure. We discuss the possibility of a notice
requirement for a nullification defense, which would add some
deterrence to the assertion of the defense and would afford the
prosecution an opportunity to mount a counter-nullification
case. Notice would also expand notions of legal relevance
throughout the trial from voir dire, to the admission of evidence, and finally to deliberation. We consider the possibility
of a bifurcated nullification instruction and deliberation: the
jury would first reach a verdict on the "factual" guilt or innocence of the defendant and then, second, consider the possibility of acquittal on the grounds that conviction would not serve
the ends of justice.
We hope that by rethinking nullification in a social context
we can empower the jury and rationalize the process, rather
than continue to gripe about a process with inadequate information about it. In the final analysis, any true redefinition of
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the American character must bring our collective sense of
justice and mercy out of the shadows. Opening up the jury
deliberation process may yet cast more light.

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF JURY NULLIFICATION
A. Early English Common Law History
and Bushell's Case
The nullification phenomenon has political roots that can be
traced back as early as 1544, when an English jury declined
to convict, on charges of high treason, the then-notorious Sir
Nicholas Throckmorton, who had openly participated in
Wyatt's Rebellion. 13 The jury acquitted Throckmorton in spite
of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt because of his ascendant political popularity. 14
Throckmorton was subsequently brought before the Court of
the Star Chamber, 15 which heard cases of particular importance to the Crown. 16 The binding over or summoning of
"runaway juries" for trial and punishment in the Star Chamber
was a common practice in England well into the seventeenth
century. 17 Juries, almost exclusively in political cases, were
menaced and ultimately convicted· "by attaint". or prosecuted
for giving false verdicts under oath. 18

13. See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETI', A CONCISE HlsToRY OF THE COMMON LAW 133-34
(5th ed. 1956).
14. Robert E. Korroch & Michael J. Davidson, Jury Nullification: A Call for
Justice or an Invitation to Anarchy?, 139 MIL. L. REV. 131, 133 n.16 (1993).
15. See JOHN BELLAMY, THE TuDOR LAW OF TREASON 172-73 (1979).
16. Other cases that the Star Chamber heard involved cases of forgery, perjury,
libel, and conspiracy. See JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 23 (1988). In addition
to reversing the jury's verdict, Throckmorton's Case, 73 Eng. Rep. 215 (KB. 1554),
the Star Chamber imprisoned the jurors themselves and fined them for their
impermissible verdict. See BELLAMY, supra note 15, at 172-73.
17. See THOMAS A GREEN, VERDICT AcCORDING TO CONSCIENCE 141-42 (discussing
juries bound over to the Star Chamber).
18. Id. False verdicts under oath were characterized as perjury. The prosecution
of disobedient juries was purportedly for juror corruption-bribery, conflict ofinterest,
and contempt. The only showing required to bind a jury over for the Star Chamber,
however, was that the jury's verdict was "contrary to the evidence," at which point
the burden of proof shifted to the jurors to establish that their decision was not a
product of improper motive. See id.
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University of Michigan Jounwl of Law Ilefonn

[VOL. 28:4

The Court of the Star Chamber was abolished by Parliament
in 1641. 19 The courts' power to harass and punish juries,
however, was retained by the common law bench through the
remedy of attaint and the power to hold juries in summary
contempt, which resulted in fines and imprisonment. 20 The
power to chill jury independence in cases where the Crown had
an interest remained relatively intact until the Court of
Common Pleas decision in Bushell's Case. 21
Bushell's Case arose from the arrest and prosecution of
Quaker leader William Penn and his associate William Mead
on grounds of violation of the Conventicle Act of 1670. 22 The
Conventicle Act was a harsh provision against religious freedom, specifically the public expression of religious beliefs in
any manner other than in accordance with the practice of the
Church of England. 23 The law was aimed particularly at
Catholics, who were thought to be devising a "Popish Plot"
linked to French imperial designs. 24
At trial, Penn and Mead stood before Sir Samuel Starling,
Judge and Lord-Mayor of London, a group of aldermen, and a
jury of twelve. 25 In effect, Penn and Mead admitted to the
assembly that they had preached to a large crowd but denied
breaking any valid law. 26 Judge Starling had both defendants

19. GUINTHER, supra note 16, at 23.
20. See generally GREEN, supra note 17, at 209-12 (describing the fining ofjurors
in the Quaker cases of the 1660s).
21.
1 Vaughan 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670).
22.
Conventicle Act, 1670, 22 Car. II, ch. 1 (Eng.), reprinted in PAULL. HUGHES
& RoBERT F. FRIES, CROWN AND PARLIAMENT IN TUooR-STuART ENGLAND 271-72 (1959);
GUINTHER, supra note 16, at 24. On August 14, 1670, while Penn was preaching to a
crowd on a London street corner, with Mead in close attendance, they were arrested
for seditiously causing "a tumult" in violation of the Conventicle Act. See Scheflin,
supra note 8, at 170.
23.
Conventicle Act, 1670, 22 Car. II, ch. 1.
24.
Though not the stated target of the law, Quakers became the main focus of
prosecution under the Conventicle Act because of their public expression of their
religion and the suspicion of some that the Quakers were secret Papists. See GUINTHER,
supra note 16, at 24. Some thought that Quaker pacificism was designed to bring
down England's military guard against invasion from the continent. Id.
25. See VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 21 (1986). A record of
the proceedings of this trial is reported in The Trial of William Penn and William
Mead, 2 A COMPLETE COU.ECTION OF SrATE-~ AND PRocEEDINGS UPON HlGH-TREAsoN,
AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANOURS 606 (2d ed. 1730) [hereinafter STATE TRIALS].
26.
2 STATE TRIALS, supra note 25, at 608. In presenting their cases to the jury pro
se, as trials for sedition did not permit representation by counsel, both defendants
spoke eloquently of the right to free worship. See id. Penn argued that "tumult"
required an intent to breach the peace and declared the defendants' motives completely peaceful. See id. at 610.
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locked in the bail-dock during the balance of the trial for
having the temerity to challenge the purposes and enforcement
of the Conventicle Act in public. The Recorder then recited the
undisputed facts underlying the indictment to the jury while
Penn was said to have been heard shouting through the bars
of the bail-dock: "I appeal to the Jury, who are my Judges, and
this great Assembly, whether the proceedings of the Court are
not most Arbitrary and void of all Law, in offering to give the
Jury their charge in the absence of the Prisoners."27
Despite threats and entreaties by the judge, the jury refused to make a finding of unlawful assembly. 28 Starling then
tried to force a verdict satisfactory to the Crown by jailing
the jury and denying them food or water. 29 Two days· passed,
and the jury returned its final verdict, not guilty for both of
the accused. 30
Judge Starling was bound by law to enter an acquittal for
Penn and Mead on the indicted charge; however, he fined the
defendants and the jurors for contempt and jailed them when
they refused to pay~ 31 The defendants and eight of the jurors
soon paid their fines and were released. 32 However, four of the
jurors refused to pay their fines and remained incarcerated in
Newgate Prison while arguing an appeal to the Court of
Common Pleas. 33 A year later, the appeal judgment was rendered and the convictions were reversed. 34 The Chief Justice
of the Court, Sir John Vaughan, pronounced that no jury could
be punished for its verdict, whether by attaint or by fine. 35
Thus, jury nullification was established in the common law.

27.. Id. at 609.
28. See Scheflin, supra note 8, at 170-71. After a short deliberation, the jury
returned eight to four for conviction. Threats were made both from the bench and
from seated aldermen towards the four holdouts and the jury was sent back to find
a unanimous and "acceptable" verdict. Soon thereafter, the jury returned with a
unanimous decision-not guilty for Mead, and guilty for Penn, but only for "speaking at Gracechurch Street." Id. at 170.
29. Id.
30.
2 STATE TRIALS, supra note 25, at 612.
31. See Scheflin, supra note 8, at 171.
32. See GUINTHER, supra note 16, at 27.
33.
GREEN, supra note 17, at 236.
34. See 1 Vaughan 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670).
35. Id.
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In B1J:shell's Case, Vaughan rejected any notion of objective
truth by which to grade a jury's verdict. 36 He likened the
individual's assessment of testimony to the varying personal
interpretations of religious texts. 37 Such variance in the understanding of the same evidence by judge and jury did not
necessarily implicate insincerity or corruption on the part of
the jury but, on the contrary, was the expected order of
things. 38
Not surprisingly, Chief Justice Vaughan chose not to discuss
the underlying politics or theology of the jury. Specifically, he
chose not to consider the role of the jury as a check on judicial
tyranny or as a check on the enforcement by the Crown of
unjust laws. 39 In fact, Vaughan's opinion is not reasoned in a
way specific to crimes of conscience. The very political nature
of the prosecution of Penn and other Quakers, howev~r, made
jury independence a highly charged political issue. Thus, it is
of no surprise that the precedent of Bushell's Case, though
meaning little in the ordinary criminal matter, became very
important to the prosecution of political crimes-in particular,
treason, unlicensed publications, and seditious libel. 40
During this same period, the Crown, under the Stuart
Monarchy, sought to broaden the use of the courts to purge and·
punish those whom it viewed as subversive. The Stuart period
was a period of inquisition in England, spear-headed by Titus
Oates's concoction of the "Popish Plot" to assassinate Charles
II and install a Catholic monarch. 41
36.
that:

Id. at 148, 124 Eng. Rep. at 1012-13. Most familiarly, Vaughan pronounced

A man cannot see by anothers eye, nor hear by anothers ear, no more can a
man conclude or inferr the thing to be resolv'd by anothers understanding or
reasoning; and though the verdict be right the jury give, yet they being not
assur'd it is so from their own understanding, are forsworn, at least in foro
conscientiae.
Id.
37. Id. at 141, 124 Eng. Rep. at 1009.
38.
GREEN, supra note 17, at 239-49.
39. Similarly, Vaughan did not cite to any theological doctrine of conscience or
to the right of the jury to apply the law mercifully. It is inconceivable, however, that
Vaughan did not realize that his opinion, limited to the issue of jury verdict nonreviewability, would affect the ongoing debate and the law itself.
40. See GREEN, supra note 17, at 249.
41.
Id. at 250-51. See generally JOHN POLLOCK, THE POPISH PLoT (1903) (providing
a complete history of the alleged Popish Plot). Examples ofjury-packing, prosecutorial
and judicial misconduct, excessive· sentencing and punishment, and other
manipulations have been documented. E.g., GREEN, supra note 17, at 251. Neverthe-

SUMMER 1995)

Jury Nullification in a New Context

871

In order to curb jury non-compliance protected from sanctions
under Bushell's Case, the Stuart judges established the doctrine of seditious libel. In a seditious libel case, the jury was
only instructed to find whether or not the defendant published
the words in question. The seditious nature and intent of those
words became a matter of law for the judge to decide. 42

B. American Colonial History and Zenger's Case
The Stuart doctrine of seditious libel was exported to the
American colonies along with the English tradition of jury
trials. William Penn himself wrote the Frame of Government
for the colonists of Pennsylvania, extending to its inhabitants
civil liberties yet unrealized in England, such as freedom of
religion and limitations on capital punishment. 43 However,
Penn retained and liberally enforced Stuart seditious libel laws
that penalized criticism of the government. 44
The most prominent defendant to be charged with seditious
libel in Pennsylvania was William Bradford, a printer known
for his mocking portrayals of the colonial governor and of Penn
in particular. 45 Bradford w·as arrested twice and prosecuted
once for printing allegedly seditious material. 46 Ultimately
discouraged by the censorial Pennsylvania authorities, Bradford moved his printing press to New York, where he became
the publisher of the Gazette and hired a young apprentice
named John Peter Zenger. 47

less, a number of courageous juries bucked the tide of anti-Jesuit emotion and
acquitted defendants even during this period of political and religious oppression. See
id.
42.
Similar doctrines parsing the fact-finding role of the judge and jury were also
developed for homicide and unlawful assembly cases. See id. at 254. These doctrines
were developed in response to juries, which, now immune from sanctions, arrived at
unacceptable verdicts in political cases. See Thomas A. Green, The Jury, Seditious
Libel, and the Criminal Law in R.H. HELMHOLZ & THOMAS A GREEN, JuR!Es, LIBEL, &
JUSTICE: THE RoLE OF ENGLISH JURIES IN l 7TH AND 18TH CENTuRY TRIALS FOR LIBEL AND
SLANDER 37 (1984).
43. ·GUINTHER, supra note 16, at 27.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 27-28.
46. Id. at 28.
4 7.
See id. at 27-28. See generol.ly JAMES ALExANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CAsE
AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER (Stanley N. Katz ed., 1963) (giving an account of
Zenger's Case, based on Alexander Hamilton's notes).
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Zenger worked as an employee for Bradford and later became
partners with him for fifteen years. 48 In 1726, Zenger left and
started his own printing business. 49 He first specialized in
religious tracts but in 1733 began publishing the New York
Weekly Journal. 50 The Journal was a political paper whose
main target was William Cosby, the Royal Governor of New
York. 51 On November 2, 1734, Governor Cosby had four issues
of the Journal publicly burned. 52 On November 17th, Zenger
was arrested and charged with seditious libel for the antiCosby material in his weekly. 53
Zenger was prosecuted for seditious libel. 54 At trial, Zenger's
attorney could neither argue that the opinions published in the
Journal were not malicious nor prove that they were factually
based. Truth was not a defense for seditious libel, as it is under
modern libel law, and the malicious and seditious quality of a
statement was determined by the bench, not the jury. 55 The
jury's sole job was to find whether or not a statement was
made or published. 56 Thus precluded by the law of seditious
libel, Zenger's attorney could only urge the jury to nullify the
law:
It is the Cause of Liberty; and I make no Doubt but your

upright Conduct, this Day, will not only entitle you to the
Love and Esteem of your Fellow-Citizens; but every Man
who prefers Freedom to a Life of Slavery will bless you and
honour You, as Men who have baffled the Attempt of
Tyranny. 57

ALEXANDER, supra note 47, at 8.
Id.
Id.
51. See id. Cosby was purportedly an acquisitive, power hungry man who exacted
large sums from the New York council and sued the former governor, Rip Van Dam,
for half of his salary. For this and other alleged official misconduct, including electoral
manipulations, Cosby became a generally despised figure and the target of political
cartoons, advertising, and editorials in Zenger's journal. See Philip B. Scott, Jury
Nullification: An Historical Perspectiue on a Modern Debate, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 389,
410-15; see also GUINTHER, supra note 16, at 27-30 (describing Cosby's arrival and
reputation in New York).
52.
ALEXANDER, supra note 47, at 18.
53.
Id.
54.
Id. at 12.
55. Id.
56.
GUINTHER, supra note 16, at 29.
48.
49.
50.

57.

LIVINGSTON RUTHERFORD, JOHN PETER ZENGER 123 (1941).
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After summations, the jury retired to deliberate. They returned
shortly thereafter with a not-guilty verdict, and Zenger was
acquitted. 58
Zenger and his fellow publishers printed transcripts of the
trial, and word of the verdict spread throughout the colonies
and back to England. 59 Though not a landmark precedent in
the way that Bushell's Case was, the Zenger's Case verdict
effectively ended the prosecution of seditious libel cases in the
colonies. 60

. C. Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Developments
The nineteenth-century American common law continued the
jury nullification trend in crimes of conscience cases. However,
the jurisprudence of jury nullification began to shift. The
common law tradition and American constitutional history
through the early nineteenth century held that the jury was
the arbiter of the facts and of the law, a formulation consistent
with jury nullification. 61 This recognition of the plenary power
of the jury was not inconsistent with the revolutionary spirit
of a young nation that had defied its sovereign in declaring
independence, and with that, its own sense of justice. 62
It was in a case involving the highly charged political issue
of slavery that the winds began to change. United States v.
Battiste 63 concerned the prosecution of a sailor who allegedly

58. Scott, supra note 51, at 415.
59. See ALEXANDER, supra note 47, at 36-37.
.
60. See id. at 34-35. Arguably, Zenger's Case also stands for a full appreciation
of trial by jury and a deep distaste for excessive bail and fines.
61. See William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background of John Marshall's Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REV. 893, 915-16 (1978).
62.
Professor Nelson notes that the transfer of the law-finding function from the
jury to the judge reflected a shift from a conception of law as a mechanism that
preserves local power, builds local consensus, and mirrors shared values, to a
mechanism that enforce·s personal choices, resolves individual disputes, and protects
private control over economic resources. WILLIAM NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE
COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MAssAcHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1700-1830, at
173-74 (1975). These considerations and the development of certain jury controls in
the civil context may be less applicable in the criminal context, which suggests that
the policies inherent in the earlier law-finding function of the jury may still be more
relevant in the criminal context. See id. at 27 n.37 (noting that the transformation
from jury law-finding to fact-fmding in Massachusetts did not occur as rapidly in
criminal cases as it did in civil cases).
63.
24 F. Cas. 1042 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14,545).
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had seized a black man in Massachusetts with the. intent to
sell him into servitude. Justice Story, concerned that a Northern abolitionist jury would summarily convict the defendant,
instructed:
[I]t [is] the most sacred constitutional right of every party
accused of a crime, that the jury should respond as to the
facts, and the court as to the law. It is the duty of the court
to instruct the jury as to the law; and it is the duty of the
jury to follow the law, as it is laid down by the court. 64
Justice Story found that the statute under which the defendant
was charged was not intended to cover sailors who h&d neither
enslaved a "negro or mullatto" directly nor had title or interest
in the slaves. 65 The jury acquitted the defendant. 66 To that
extent, Justice Story's counter-nullification instruction prevented a conviction. 67
Not coincidentally, the Battiste decision arrived on the cusp
of a particularly volatile time in the history of the American
jury. Under the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850,68 "aiders and
abettors" of alleged fugitive slaves could be held liable both
criminally and civilly. 69 Massachusetts and Pennsylvaniajurors
in particular were celebrated for nullifying judicial instructions
and finding for defendants in "aiding and abetting" cases. 70 A
number of trial judges at the time refused defense requests to
charge juries that they had the independent right to find the
law in fugitive slave cases. 71 Nevertheless, northern jurors
often found ways to acquit defendants, following their consciences and disregarding the judge's instructions.
The precedential significance of Battiste remained somewhat
unclear until Spar{ and Hansen u. United States, 12 sixty years
later. In Spar{ and Hansen, members of the crew of the Ameri-

Id. at 1043. Justice Story presided over this case as the Circuit Justice.
Id. at 1045.
Id.
Cf. Scheflin, supra note 8, at 177-78 (noting that Justice Story, while
conceding the jury's power to nullify, successfully persuaded the jurors that they did
not have the moral right to do so).
68.
Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (repealed 1864).
69.
See RoBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
64.
65.
66.
67.

190-91
70.
71.
72.

(1975).

Id. at 191.
Id.
156 U.S. 51 (1894).
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can vessel, Hesper, were charged with and convicted for murder. One of the issues on appeal was the trial court's refusal
to instruct the jury that, as an alternative to murder, the jury
could convict the defendant of manslaughter. The trial court
had instead instructed the jury that, although it had the power
to return a verdict of manslaughter, any verdict other than
murder, ifa felonious homocide had been committed, would be
improper. 73
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, finding that the
trial judge's instruction was correct and holding that, although
the jury had the power to ignore the judge's charge on the law,
it had no right to do so. 74 According to Justice Harlan, a jury
that disobeys a judge's instruction on the law acts contrary to
the law, but the judge cannot set aside an acquittal or direct
a conviction. 75
This formulation of a jury's power to disobey a judge's
instruction-the power to nullify versus its right to do so-has
dominated much of the case law and scholarship since Justice
Harlan's opinion. 76 Spar{ and Hansen presented a relatively
narrow· issue to the Court: whether a judge may refuse to
instruct a jury on a particular matter of law if the judge
deems that law to be inapplicable to the facts presented at
trial. 77 According to Justice Harlan, it is not error not to
instruct a jury on inapplicable law. 78 A narrower reading of
Sparfand Hansen might suggest the following issue: whether
a judge may instruct a jury that its failure to follow the instructions would be inconsistent with the law, though beyond
the court's power to control. The Court answered that question
in the affirmative, without breaking from prior common law
and constitutional understandings of the jury's proper function
and power. 79 Given either reading, Spar{ and Hansen has

73. See id. at 60-61. The trial judge charged: "[A]s I have said in this case, if a
felonious homicide has been committed at all, of which I repeat you are the judges,
there is nothing to reduce it below the grade of murder." Id. at 60 (emphasis omitted).
74.
Id. at 101-03.
.
75.
Id. at 106.
76. See infra Part III.
77. See 156 U.S. at 63, 103.
78.
See id. at 106 ("We are of the opinion that the court below did not err in
saying to the jury that they could not consistently with the law ... find the defendants guilty of manslaughter or of any offense less than the one charged ....").
79. See id.
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come to mean that jury nullification instructions are impermissible in a federal court. 80
Thus, the common law history of jury nullification, from the
birth of the Star Chamber and through the nineteenth century,
is a composite of "conscience cases," in which juries have
declared their independence from tyrannical laws enforced
against political, social, and religious dissidents. 81 The use of
jury nullification as a political tool continues into recent times.

D. The Vietnam War Resister Cases
Many, if not all, of the issues in Bushell's Case, Zenger's
Case, and the Fugitive Slave cases were again articulated in
the Vietnam War resister cases. The war resister cases share
a common fact pattern. In each case, the government prosecuted one or more anti-war activists who had broken laws
during protests, usually through acts of civil disobedience.
These acts ranged from the destruction of government property, 82 to violation of the Selective Service Act, 83 conspiracy to
aid in draft evasion, 84 malicious destruction, and unlawful
entry. 85
In a number of cases, the defense requested a nullification
instruction that would have permitted a juror's own sense of
justice to enter into the deliberation and override the judge's
instructions on the law. 86 In each case, the court refused to
give a nullification instruction, and in some cases the court

80. See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 519 (9th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1007 (4th Cir. 1969).
81. Of course, Spar{ and Hansen is not a political case, and Battiste is political
only in the sense that Justice Story's charge responded to the threat of a politically
motivated nullification conviction against the defendant. See Scheflin, supra note 8,
at 178. Much of the reasoning in Battiste in opposition to jury nullification responds
to this purported fear of nullification convictions. See United States v. Battiste, 24
F. Cas. 1042, 1043 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14,545). The court argued at length that
a jury that is the arbiter of the law endangers the defendant's due process rights and
threatens the prosecution. Id.
82. E.g., Simpson, 460 F.2d 515; Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002.
83. E.g., United States v. Boardman, 419 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1969).
84. E.g., United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969).
85. E.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
86. For a discussion of nullification instructions in Vietnam era cases, see
William M. Kunstler, Jury Nullification in Conscience Cases, 10 VA. J. INT'L L. 71
(1969); Joseph L. Sax, Conscience and Anarchy: The Prosecution of War Resisters, 57
YALE REV. 484 (1968).
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instructed the jury that the reasons behind the defendant's
acts of civil disobedience were irrelevant to the issue of
criminal liability. 87 This counter-nullification instruction also
served to negate arguments by the defense that acts of civil
disobedience could be justified by necessity, defense of others,
emergency, moral compulsion, or choice of the lesser evil. 88
· In at least one war resister case, the trial court attempted
to exert more extensive jury control and was reversed on
appeal. In United States v. Spock, 89 the trial court had instructed the jury to deliver special verdicts in order to ensure
that the jury could not nullify. The Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit reversed the defendants' convictions for conspiracy
to aid draft evaders, holding that the ·special verdicts were
prejudicial and improper because they sought to control the
jury's right to unfettered deliberation. 90 In discussing the right
of a jury to deliberate, the court recognized the power of a jury
to acquit notwithstanding a factual finding of liability. 91 One
can liken the court's disavow~! of special verdicts, particularly
in a political case like Spock, to earlier resistance against the
Stuart formulation of seditious libel, which also sought, by
parsing issues of fact and law, to control the jury's power to
deliberate and nullify the judge's charge.
In contrast to Spock, most of the other war resister cases
follow a more familiar pattern, relying on Spar{ and Hansen
for the rule that a jury nullification instruction is impermissible in federal court because the jury has no "right" to disregard
the judge's instruction. 92

87. See, e.g., Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1137-38 n.54.
88. See id.
89.
416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969).
90. Id. at 181.
91. Id. at 182.
92. See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 519 (9th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1007 (4th Cir. 1969). The only case that truly stands
out among the war resister cases is United States v. Dougherty, largely for the
comprehensive dissent of Judge Bazelon. 473 F.2d 1113, 1138-48 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(Bazelon, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (maintaining that nullification
"permits the Jury to bring to bear on the criminal process a sense of fairness and
particularized justiceD).

878

University of Michigan Journal of Law lleform

[VOL. 28:4

II. PRESENT-DAY NULLIFICATION ISSUES
Given the political history behind jury nullification, it is
ironic that the current debate on verdicts takes place not in the
rarified air of crimes of conscience but in the superheated
atmosphere of notorious crimes of passion. The media coverage
surrounding these verdicts has obscured the relationship between political and apolitical cases. In each type of case, juries
have grappled with issues of justice and mercy despite strong
evidence of guilt. Recent commentators have failed to acknowledge that the reactions of present day juries are directly
analogous to jury reactions recorded at least as far back as the
1950s. 93
Indeed, in the wake of hung juries in the trials of the
Menendez brothers and the jury acquittal of Lorena Bobbitt,
there has been much discussion in the media about whether
the use of criminal defenses, such -as "victimization" or "abuse
excuse," has increased. 94 Indeed, such defenses have been
asserted in both celebrated cases as well as in the relatively
obscure. 95 What has been forgotten in the spate of publicity
93.
Cf KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 6, at 223-26 (discussing juries' willingness
to acquit in cases involving reprisals against violent aggressors).
94. See generally DERSHOWITZ, supra note 5 (arguing that the "abuse·excuse" is
being used with greater frequency and success and noting that it is the subject of daily
discussion on radio and television talk shows). Indeed, justification defenses in highly
charged cases, offered to the jury and accepted apparently at face value, have been
criticized by Professor Dershowitz as "lawless invitation[s) to vigilantism." Id. at 27.
Professor Dershowitz also calls the apparent proliferation of these defenses a "national
abdication of personal responsibility." Id. at 41.
95.
Some examples of these defenses include:
1. Mob frenzy defense: the defense of Damian Williams, accused of.beating truck
driver, Reginald Denny, during the 1992 Los Angeles riots. Williams was
acquitted of felony charges in his state trial;
2. Black rage defense: the proposed, but later abandoned, defense theory of Colin
Ferguson, accused of shooting six people to death on a Long Island Railroad
commuter train;
3. Abused child defense: the defense used by the Menendez brothers, accused of
shooting their parents to death. The brothers were tried before two separate
juries that were both unable to reach a verdict resulting in mistrials for the
brothers;
4. Battered spouse defense: the defense put forward by Lorena Bobbitt, accused
of severing her husband's penis. The jury returned a verdict of not-guilty by
reason of temporary insanity;
5. Urban survival syndrome: the defense of Damion Osby, accused of shooting two
unarmed African American men in a parking lot;
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about these cases and in the outcry that their verdicts have
produced is that the results of these trials are neither particularly new nor novel. Obscured by the media frenzy is the extent
to which jury nullification may be at work.
Before the apparent proliferation of these types of cases,
critics had expressed discomfort with justification defenses. 96
The rise of the insanity defense, for example, has been characterized for years as "almost wholly dominat[ing]" the area of
criminal responsibility. 97 As Professor Alan Scheflin notes, a
jury is asked to determine criminal responsibility by focusing
on, among other factors, the defendant's criminal intent. 98 In
the insanity defense context, Scheflin argues, the jury is asked
to make a decision involving moral, legal,. and medical judgments in deciding whether the defendant had the requisite
psychiatric condition to exculpate the defendant of criminal
responsibility. 99 Thus, the jury must act as the "referee in a
battle of experts despite the lack of expertise on their part to
make a responsible and intelligent choice. "100 According to
Scheflin, the rise of various insanity defenses has obscured the
role and function of the jury because a guilty verdict should

6. Steroid rage defense: the defense of Troy Mentzler, accused of tossing rocks at
cars on an interstate highway;
7. Fetal trimethadione syndrome: the defense of Eric Smith, accused of beating a
4-year-old to death, attributing the action to his mother's epilepsy medication
taken during pregnancy; and
8. Adopted-child syndrome: the defense of accused serial killer, Joel Rifkin, who
allegedly murdered 17 women.

See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 5, at 321-41 (providing a "glossary of abuse excuses,"
including the mob frenzy defense); Walter Goodman, Examining the Abuse Defense
in Trials, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1994, at C20 (reviewing Don't Blame Me, a television
special surveying different victimization defenses, and pointing to the influence of talk
shows for "spreading the notion that everyone is a victim"); Gregory, supra note 5,
at 30-31 (discussing the black rage, urban survival, and battered spouse defenses);
John T. McQuiston, A Novel Insanity Defense for Joel Rifkin, N.Y. TIMES, July 26,
1994, at Bl (describing the adopted-child defense); Margot Slade, supra note 2, at B20
(noting the trend of defendants to portray themselves as victims by creating such
defenses as steroid rage, fetal trimethadione syndrome, and others).
96. See, e.g., Scheflin, supra note 8, at 193-94 (discussing the role of the jury in
criminal responsibility defenses, such as insanity, and in mitigation factors, such as
poverty).
97. Id.
98. See id.
99. Id. at 194; cf. Debra West, Accused's Words at Core of Insanity Defense, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 27, 1994, at 58 (illustrating the various considerations in a New York case
involving an insanity defense).
100. Scheflin, supra note 8, at 194.
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represent the community's decision that the defendant's conduct warrants moral condemnation. 101
The jury's range of choices in determining criminal responsibility need not be seen as so limited. While some or all of
these defenses may be quite legitimate-indeed more than a
few have been successful-the debate concerning their propriety would be informed greatly by some indication of whether
the juries consider these defenses on their own terms or merely
as surrogates for impermissible concerns that a nullification
instruction would otherwise permit. 102 Moreover, the broader
conclusions drawn by some social commentators relating to the
apparent proliferation of "abuse excuse" defenses have assumed
a distinctly political tone and are often linked to a conservative
agenda. 103 Unless the jury deliberation process is rationalized,
however, there can be no real basis upon which to make an
informed analysis of the actual reasons behind the outcome of
trials involving "abuse excuse" defenses or any other defenses
where there is room for nullification.

A. "Inside the Jury Room"
In the television documentary, Inside the Jury Room, a jury
seized upon a fact-finding fiction to justify a result that nullified the court's instructions on the law .104 Inside the Jury Room
followed the trial of Leroy Reed, a mentally impaired defendant, who was· tried for violating a Minnesota law which
forbade former felons from carrying guns. 105 Reed had bought
the gun because he wanted to become a private investigator

101. See id.
102. The concern may in fact be overstated because cases in which an insanity
defense goes to a jury are extremely rare. For example, in New York State, it has been
estimated that only 3 in every 1000 cases propose an insanity defense, and of that
number, only 7% are heard by a jury; the rest are concluded through plea bargain or
other resolution. See West, supra note 99, at 58. Moreover, notwithstanding suspicions
about the ability of juries to understand insanity defenses, all diminished capacity
defenses claim that the defendant lacked the requisite mens rea and thus should not
be found guilty of the crime charged. Thus, a jury's finding ofinsanity is, in actuality,
a determination that the defendant's conduct does not warrant the community's moral
condemnation.
103. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
104. Frontline #410: Inside the Jury Room (PBS television broadcast, Apr. 8, 1986)
(transcript on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
105. Id. (transcript at 2).

SUMMER 1995)

Jury Nullification in a New Context

881

and believed from watching his favorite television program that
all one needed to do to become a private investigator was to
carry a pistol. 106 In fact, the defendant was so naive that he
handed the sales slip for the gun to a detective when asked for
identification. The receipt was taken to the sheriffs office
whereupon Reed was instructed to get the gun. 107 When he dutifully presented himself with his new gun, he was arrested. 108
The elements of the crime were straightforward. All the prosecution had to establish was that Reed was a former felon and
that he owned a gun. The court denied the defense's request
to have a nullification instruction given to the jury. 109 The
judge, however, did permit defense counsel to present a "nullification summation" through which counsel exhorted the jury to
employ mercy and common sense to acquit the defendant.
Rather than simply acquit Reed because the circumstances
indicated prosecutorial overreaching and misjudgment, the
jurors finally reached the tenuous factual conclusion that Reed
did not have any knowledge that he was carrying a weapon
because he had a diminished intellectual capacity. 110 The jury
reached this conclusion despite the defendant's own testimony
that he bought the gun and wanted to carry it _because a gun
was an accoutrement of a famous televison character, the
"Equalizer."m Indeed, the jury's anguish lay not in their
concern that they consciously were violating their oath as
jurors; on the contrary, much of their difficulty was created by
their reliance upon tortured fictions which they needed to erect
in order to support their final conclusion on the facts.
This is a kind of "nullification by misdirection," where
surrogate issues within the jury's fact-finding province are
deliberated, and where fictions are created to reach a result
consistent with the jury's sense of justice. This kind of jury
behavior clouds the deliberation process, obscures the meaning
of the verdict, and consequently undermines respect for the
jury system as a whole. 112

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(transcript at 4).
(transcript at 5).
(transcript at 11).
(transcript at 15).
(transcript at 2).
As Jeffrey Abramson notes:

[J]urors are discouraged from openly deliberating about the justice of enforcing
the law and are no doubt forced frequently into smuggling their views on the
justice oflaw into 'approved debate' about the evidence or facts .... Would not
the quality of the debate ... be better if jurors were told that such debate was
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B. The American Jury
The phenomenon of seizing on collateral issues in order to
arrive at a merciful verdict is neither rare, nor isolated, nor
new; What happened during the deliberations at the trial of
Leroy Reed is typical of deliberating juries. A study by Harry
Kalven and Hans Zeisel, The American Jury, examined several
thousand jury verdicts. 113 This study remains an authoritative
source in revealing the operation of the jury system, ·even
though it relied on data now almost forty years old. 114
The Kalven & Zeisel study used judges both as subjects and
as reporters. By mailed questionnaire, judges were asked,
regarding the cases tried before them: (1) how the jury decided
the case, (2) how they would have decided the case had it been
a bench trial, and (3) to provide some descriptions and evaluations of the case, the counsel, and the parties. 115 Because the
study tracks instances solely where the presiding judge and the
jury disagreed on the outcome of a particular trial and is based
exclusively on reports by the judge, 116 it is impossible to make
any definitive pronouncements about jury nullification. Nevertheless, the study offers powerful insights into the deliberation
process of juries, because presiding judges have firsthand
exposure to the same evidence and arguments. 117
The Kalven & Zeisel study reinforces the notion that nullification occurs in many more cases than just cases where there
may be jury dissatisfaction with a particular law or where the
outcome would conflict with a jury's sense of conscience or
religious conviction. 118 Nullification is often simply a check on
part of their function, that we cherish trial by jury precisely because we expect
ordinary citizens to repudiate laws, or instances of law enforcement, that are
repugnant to their consciences?
JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 67 (1994).
113. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 6, at 33 & n.1{including3576 criminal trials
occurring mainly during 1954-1955 and 1958).
114. See id. Professors Kalven and Zeisel estimated that, in 1955, 60,000 criminal
trials were tried to a verdict in the United States. Id. at 12.
115. Id. at 45 n.l, 56-57 {finding that juries and judges disagreed on the outcome
in 24.6% of the sample cases).
116. Id. at 45 n.l.
117. See id. at 94-96 {explaining why judges are a reliable source in locating the
areas of disagreement between judge and jury).
118. See generally id. at 104-17 (determining that jurors commonly nullify when
they feel that the probable sentence will be too severe for the crime committed).

SUMMER 1995]

Jury Nullification in a New Context

883

prosecutorial discretion. Many juries nullify simply by bringing
extralegal concerns into their deliberations or by engaging in
fictions about the elements of the crime or the credibility of the
evidence. 119
Kalven and Zeisel termed the extralegal exercise as "the
liberation hypothesis. "120 Although careful not to label this
"liberation" as a "jury nullification," Kalven and Zeisel studied
cases in which the jury disagreed with the judge's outcome
based not only upon evidentiary difficulties but also upon the
jury's differing sentiments and values. 121 According to Kalven
and Zeisel, the underlying jury sentiment gives direction to the
resolution of the evidentiary doubt, and the evidentiary doubt
provides a condition for a response to the sentiment. 122 Thus,
the jury's sentiment works to liberate it from the confines of
the evidence. 123 As Kalven and Zeisel observe:
We know, from other parts of our jury study, that the jury
does-not often consciously and explicitly yield to sentiment
in the teeth of the law. Rather it yields to sentiment in the
. apparent process of resolving doubts as to evidence. The

119. Id. at 166-67 (offering two explanations for judge-jury disagreement: (1) the
credibility hypothesis, disagreement over an item of proof, and (2) the reasonable
doubt standard, where a "jury will tolerate less doubt in convicting than will the
judge").
120. Id. at 486 (defining the liberation hypothesis as "the yielding to sentiment
in the guise of evaluating factual doubt").
121. · Id. at 164-66.
122. Id.
123. For example, in the first trial of the four police officers accused of beating
Rodney King, the jury refused to convict Officer Laurence Powell for using deadly
force against King. Despite the testimony of four eyewitnesses that Powell landed the
initial blows to King's head, the jury discarded the testimony, in part, because it was
not corroborated by 15 blurry seconds of videotape. See D.M. Osborne, Reaching for
Doubt, AM. LAW., Sept. 1992, at 65. For the majority of the Simi Valley jurors who
had a "reverence for police officers as guardians of the social order," the explicit and
shocking videotape actually undermined the prosecution's case. Id.
In the trials of Damian Williams and Henry Watson, who were accused of beating
truckdriver Reginald Denny during the Los Angeles riots after the Rodney King
verdicts, the jury also saw explicit videotape evidence and heard testimony that
Williams had threatened to "hurt and kill people." Edward J. Boyer, No Threats Made,
Denny Juror Contends; Trial: Contradicting Televised Claims by an Alternate Panelist,
Juror 251 Acknowledges That Tempers Flared. But She Says That No One's "Personal
Safety• Was Jeopardized, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1993, at B3. One juror explained,
however, that she had a reasonable doubt that either defendant had a specific intent
to kill Denny because the witness placed the statement at a time before the Rodney
King verdicts came out. Id.

884

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 28:4

jury, therefore, is able to conduct its revolt from the law
within the etiquette of resolving issues of fact. 124
Whether one describes the jury's revolt from the law as a form
of "etiquette" or as a surrogate for nullification, the result is
the same-the jury has decided to acquit notwithstanding the
evidence.
The tendency of the jury in the 1950s to use surrogates for
nullification has analogues in the well-publicized _verdicts of
the past decade. For example, when a defendant asserts a selfdefense argument, juries tend to expand the doctrine, showing
what Kalven and Zeisel describe as "an impatience with the
nicety of the law's boundaries. "125 Kalven and Zeisel discern
this trend particularly in self-defense cases in which there has
been a history of prior abuse or unfaithfulness on the part of
the victim. 126 The juries apparently expand the notions of selfdefense either to acquit the defendant or to find guilt on lesser
charges. 127 Thus, at least in the area of self-defense, the
appearance of surrogate nullification strategies is not a new
phenomenon. 128 Whatever moves juries in the 1990s was
equally persuasive to juries forty years ago.

C. The Bobbitt Jury
The tendency of the jury to expand notions of self-defense
could have been at work during the jury deliberations leading
to the finding of temporary insanity in the highly publicized
Lorena Bobbitt case. The Bobbitt case involved a woman who
claimed that she was systematically beaten and abused by her
husband, leading her to cut off her husband's penis while he
slept. 129 Her defense at trial was that at the time of the act

124. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 6, at 165.
125. Id. at 240-41.
126. See id. at 231-36.
127. Id.
128. See ABRAMSON, supra note 112, at 94-95 (recounting an instance from
fourteenth-century England where the trial jury in a heat-of-passion case found
different facts than did the inquest jury and acquitted the defendant on grounds of
self-defense).
129. See David Margolick, Lorena Bobbitt Acquitted in Mutilation ofHer Husband,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1994, § 1, at 1 (reporting on the trial and verdict).
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she was temporarily insane and lacked any rational understanding of the circumstances. 130
By the end of the deliberations, the jury unanimously believed her defense. 131 However, they initially had split on
whether to acquit or to convict. 132 Yet, they quickly moved to
a point where nine jurors fav~red acquittal and three held out
for a conviction. 133 What is most interesting is that a key piece
of evidence discussed by holdout jurors to favor .acquittal was
a statement made by a police officer during his interview with
Lorena Bobbitt on the night of the act. 134 Despite Bobbitt's
detailed narrative of her actions prior and subsequent to the
dismemberment, when the officer asked her whether she
"didn't know what was happening," she responded affirmatively.135 This interview persuaded the holdout jurors to conclude that Bobbitt did not have the mens rea required to
convict her. 136
Whether the Bobbitt jury acquitted based solely on a faithful
interpretation of the elements of the substantive charge or
based on an expansion of the notion of self-defense is unclear.
Given the public's interest in this case, however, it would have
been helpful to have had a nullification instruction in order to
understand the true motivations of the jurors, unfettered by
the constraints of their present oath.

D. The Police and the Community
In instances where the police used an unusual or excessive
amount of force in arresting a suspect who resisted with
violence, Kalven and Zeisel found that juries tended to show
"a special indulgence" toward the defendant. 137 Moreover, in an

130. Id.
131. Videotape Interviews with anonymous Bobbitt Jurors, Courtroom Teleuision
Network (1994) (videotapes on file with the Uniuersity of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
132. Id. at tape 2.
133. Id.
134. Id. at tapes 1-2.
135. Id.
136. Id. at tape 1.
137. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 6, at 236--40. Kalven and Zeise! also discuss
situations in which the jury acquits "in protest against a police or prosecution practice
that it considers improper." Id. at 318-23.
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assault case where the defendant was brutally treated by the
arresting officers, the presiding judge reported:
[I]nhuman treatment of the defendant throughout the
arrest and after the arrest made the jury feel ... that he
had received unusual punishment and the verdict was
prompted to discipline the officers which, in the Court's
opinion, the jury was entitled to do. While the Court could
have dismissed the treatment angle and based its decision
on the assault, it is very understandable how the jury
reached its verdict. As a matter of fact, the rough treat~
ment of prisoners by arresting authorities is so well known
that it is difficult to get convictions where police or prosecuting detectives are involved. 138
This 1950s phenomenon has repeated itself more recently,
albeit on a community:..wide basis and regardless of whether
there has been any evidence of police misconduct. In fact, jury
trends indicate that African American and Latino communities
express general estrangement from the police and adopt, in
effect, a presumption against police witnesses through their .
verdicts. 139 In cases involving police testimony in Bronx County, New York, juries with a high proportion of minority jurors
were more willing to acquit minority defendants even when
there existed clear evidence of guilt. 140
A similar phenomenon has occurred in Brooklyn, New York,
where poor people and people of color make up a sizable
percentage of the population. 141 In that borough, jury verdicts
in gun possession cases from 1990 through 1993 were a statistical anomaly. According to figures obtained from the Office of
the Kings County District Attorney, acquittal rates in gun
possession cases ran as high or higher than acquittal rates of
prohibition violators at the height of the Prohibition Era. 142

138. Id. at 320.
139. See, e.g., John Kifner, Bronx Juries: .A Defense Dream, A Prosecution
Nightmare, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1988, at Bl.
140. Id.
141. Although whites are still the largest group in Brooklyn, they are not a
Jllajority. In 1990, they numbered 1,078,549, constituting only 47% of the borough's
total population. See Bob Liff, Diversity Key to City's Most Populous Borough,
NEWSDAY, Mar. 3, 1991, at 2. This figure includes 155,000 Latinos who identified
themselves as white. Blacks comprised the second largest group, with a population
of 872,305, or 38% of the population. Id.
142. Compare Memorandum from the Office of the Kings County District Attorney
to Professor Dorfman (July 7, 1994) (reporting gun possession acquittal rates) (on file
with the University ofMichigan Journal ofLaw Reform) with KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra
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Brooklyn juries were acquitting in gun possession cases at an
average rate of 56%, in contrast to an overall acquittal rate of
approximately 35% and in sharp contrast to a rate of 28. 7% in
narcotics cases during the same period. 143
These results are inconsistent with data indicating support
for gun control legislation by Kings County residents and
among people of color in general. 144 Thus, it seems unlikely
that Brooklyn juries were nullifying the law because of some
conscious revolt against. gun legislation in the way that Prohibition juries revolted against the Prohibition. Neither is gun
legislation unpopular. law reminiscent of the "conscience
cases." 145 Rather, the compelling conclusion is that Brooklyn
juries were not nullifying in simple gun possession cases to
protest the gun laws but to check prosecutorial discretion.
In addition,. because police testimony in simple gun possession cases is often less professional than in drug sale or possession cases, juries may be discounting police testimony, as
evidenced by the high rate of acquittal verdicts. In drug
cases-often "buy and bust" operations-police testimony is
given by undercover officers, experienced and trained in

note 6, at 292 n.10 (noting that federal juries acquitted liquor violators at the average
rate of 60% in New York City).
143. See Memorandum from the Office of the Kings County District Attorney to
Professor Dorfman, supra note 142, at 2. But cf Memorandum from the Office.ofthe
Kings County District Attorney to Professor Dorfman 1 (Nov.. 20, 1995) [hereinafter
Kings County Update) (reporting acquittal rates according to data released by the
State Division of Criminal Justice Services) (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
More recent figures indicate that, in 1994, gun possession cases resulted in only
35% acquittals at trial. Kings County Update, supra, at 1. More startling, in 1995,
gun possession cases have resulted in only 10% acquittals, which actually exceeded
the prosecutorial success rate for felony trial cases overall. This sharp decline in the
1994 and 1995 figures seems to be a result of a change in policy and practice of the
Kings County District Attorney's Office in response to the 1993 acquittal rate figures.
The Kings County District Attorney's Office may now be offering many more misdemeanor plea bargains as well as lesser included-offense plea bargains with shorter
sentences to gun possession defendants, because the Office knows that Brooklyn juries
will very likely acquit a defendant in a "garden variety" gun possession case. The
result of this practice of weeding-out the cases that may be in the least bit problematic
at trial is a much higher trial conviction rate. See infra notes 254-55 and accompanying text. This change in acquittal rates, however, does not necessarily indicate a
change in the dynamics of the Brooklyn jury.
144. "[M]ajorities of women, blacks and Democrats [nationwide thought) stricter
gun control laws [would) reduce violent crime." Jack Nelson, Most Support President
on New Gun Laws, L.A TIMES MIRROR, Dec. 10, 1993, at 24.
145. See supra Part I; see also Katherine Q. Seelye, In Gun Vote, An Odd Hero for
Liberals, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1994, at 10 (nearly 80% of Americans favor some form
of gun control).
·
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testifying before juries. 146 In gun possession cases, on the other
hand, the jury hears testimony from front-line patrol or beat
officers. The community's response, as reflected by the jury's
response to police officer testimony in general, becomes more
of a critical factor. The extent to which this response amounts
to nullification of the standard charge-instructing that a
police officer's testimony is no less credible than a civilian's-remains an open question. It is quite possible, however,
that jurors consider these police officers to be presumptively
non-credible and thereby nullify the judge's charge.
In addition, the jury sometimes considers the harm resulting
from the criminal behavior to be trivial. For example, a jury
may refuse to convict defendants of forcible robbery when the
stolen amounts were de minimis. 147 In these situations, nullification most clearly operates as a community check on prosecutorial discretion; "the jury has a somewhat narrower view than
the prosecutor or the legislator of what constitutes an offense
serious enough to rise to the dignity of the criminal law." 148
This kind of sentiment operates in the gun possession cases as
well, so long as there is no evidence that the gun was used
wrongfully.
Kalven and Zeisel stress that it is not the seriousness of the
crime that triggers what they term, the de minimis jury
response, since these types of disagreements cut across crime
categories. Thus, jury reaction to de minimis crimes is not
necessarily a criticism of the wisdom of any particular law;
rather, it is a cominent upon a particular law's application in
a given situation against a particular individual. 149
The message that Brooklyn juries are sending through their
gun possession verdicts remains unclear. Is the message an
expression of dissatisfaction with gun laws, perceptions of
unequal enforcement of the laws, the nature of the police

146. E.g., People v. Wharton, 549 N.E.2d 462 (N.Y. 1989); People v. Kelsey, 606
N.Y. S.2d 621 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
14 7. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 6, at 258-85 (applying the term "de minimis" to
refer to circumstances where there is trivial harm, no harm, cured harm, reluctance
to prosecute, small social harm, marginal illegality, or a "plague on both houses"
situation).
148. Id. at 259.
149. See id. at 345-46. For example, ajury refused to convict a bowling alley owner
for violating child labor laws, where the activity of the defendant could be interpreted
as merely trying to keep youth employed and out of trouble. The jury was not hostile
to child labor laws in general. Rather, the verdict may have been the jury's attempt
to do equity where the policy behind the law was not implicated. Id.
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presence in minority communities, or are they merely a recognition that firearms are a fact oflife in the urban landscape?
Because these issues presumably remain undiscussed in the
jury room-the judge's instructions proscribe such discussions-we may only take the verdicts at face value or surmise
an answer without an empirical or even anecdotal basis.

E. Other Examples of Jury Revolt
Kalven and Zeise! report circumstances in which the conduct
of the victims may lead juries to apply tort concepts, such as
contributory negligence or assumption of risk, even though
these concepts are inapplicable in a criminal context. 15° For
example, one jury acquitted a defendant of homicide charges
where the victims had been playing "chicken" with the defendant's automobile. The judge concluded that "[b]ecause the jury
did not follow the charge of the court, they saw some evidence
of contributory negligence on part of person assaulted. [However,] [c]ontributory negligence is no defense in the laws of this
state to criminal actions." 151
Kalven and Zeise! reason that, in certain instances, such as
where there has been restitution by the defendant, the jury's
willingness to acquit may take into account circumstances
relevant to sentencing and apply them as relevant to the
determination of guilt. 152 Kalven and Zeise! conclude that this
application indicates jury confusion over the purposes of tort
and criminal law, where the former resolves private disputes
and the latter represents societal sanctions and values. 153 This
tendency, however, may not be indicative of any confusion at
all. Because juries are both factfinders as well as surrogates
for the prosecution's client, the State, they are in the best
position to evaluate the harm inflicted.
The Kalven and Zeise! Study did not reveal any contemporary law against which the jury could be said to be revolting,
as juries had against the Prohibition laws. 154 The study did
find, however, that juries were hostile to sumptuary laws,

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 242-57.
at 243.
at 269.
at 286.
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which regulate activities such as gambling, gaming, the purchase and consumption ofliquor, and drunken driving. 155 Most
significantly, the study concluded that the recurring theme
with regard to jury antipathy toward these types of cases was
not that the juries considered the laws themselves to be unjust,
but rather "that the prosecution of the particular defendant
[seemed] to be selective and to violate the ideal of evenhanded
administration of justice." 156
In sum, one of the more striking elements of the Kalven &
Zeisel Study was evidence of jury deviance from the strict
application of the law as charged in cases other than the
"conscience cases." Moreover, the American jury's tendency to
expand notions ofjustice beyond the constraints of the applicable law has existed much longer than some observers would
have us believe. Perhaps it is because Kalven and Zeisel
believe that "nullification" is properly limited only to certain
categories of unpopular crimes that they do not recognize that
jury nullification occurs in each of these other instances as
well. 157 Nonetheless, their research reveals numerous areas in
which there is strong reluctance, if not outright refusal, by
juries to apply the law strictly as instructed, and a willingness
to reach verdicts of not guilty despite the dictates of evidence
and law. 158
The question remains, why should these instances of jury
self-deception continue when a nullification instruction would
allow jury deliberation to focus on what actually influences its
decision-the jurors' own concept ofjustice? Thus, whether a
jury ultimately accepts a victimization defense, or attempts to
circumvent the constraints of the applicable law, a properly
devised nullification instruction would allow the jury to examine honestly and directly whether any of its sentiments are
"extra-legal" and would allow them consciously to apply or
reject these sentiments while determining the verdict.

155. See id. at 296.
156. Id. at 296-97.
157. See id. Kalven and Zeise! do assert, however, that acquittals for violations
of unpopular laws, such as sumptuary laws, are "closest to classic instances of jury
revolt and nullification." Id. at 433. Additionally, they refer to capital crimes in early
nineteenth-century England as a "great source of jury nullification." Id. at 311-12 .
. 158. Kalven and Zeise! also review instances of jury discomfort where there are
issues of punishment, preferential treatment of one defendant over another, improper
police methods, and inadvertent conduct. See id. at 236-40, 301-12, 314-17, 324-28.
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III. THE POSITION AGAINST NULLIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS

Since Spar{ and Hansen, the debate surrounding the nullification instruction has centered predominantly around the
issue of a jury's right to nullify as opposed to its inchoate
power to do so. 159 The dominant judicial view, derived from
Spar{ and Hansen, is that the jury, through its delivery of a
general verdict, has the power to disregard the judge's charge
but is not entitled to do so. 16 Consequently, the jury has no
right to be informed through judicial instruction of its ability
.to disregard the judge. If a jury nullifies, it must do so purely
on its own volition.
On the other hand, those who argue for the right of the jury
to receive a nullification instruction view that right as derivative of either the "jury's right to be instructed as to its proper
function, or from the defendant's right to trial by jury." 161 In
the first instance, the right to a nullification instruction is
grounded in notions of democratic decision making. 162 Where
the jury acts· as a representative of the community, the jury
must decide whether, by "contemporary standards of moral
blameworthiness, the defendant should be punished for his

°

159. See, e.g., Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 157 (1894) (Gray,
J., dissenting) (stating that juries have the power to nullify and must have the right
to exercise it because there is no remedy against the exercise of the power); see also
Scheflin, supra note 8, at 197 (arguing that the inquiry is whether the defendant has
the right to an instruction on nullification and whether the jury has the right to be
informed of its nullification power). But see Gary J. Simson, Jury Nullification in the
American System: A Skeptical View, 54 TEX. L. REV. 488, 524 (1976) (argtiing that the
indefensibility of a right to nullify does not require limits on the jury's power to do
so); Eleanor Tavris, The Law of an Unwritten Law: A Common Sense View of Jury
Nullification, 11 W. ST. U. L. REV. 97, 105 (1983) (noting that courts' nullification
rationales usually concentrate on the issue of the power versus the right of jury
nullification).
160. See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United
States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d
1002 (4th Cir. 1969).
161. See Scheflin, supra note 8, at 222.
162. It is worth noting, however, that the issue of whether a judge may or should
instruct the jury on its power to nullify was not expressly decided by the Court in
Spar( and Hansen. In fact, by not finding error in the trial court's instruction, 156
U.S. at 106-07, the Court approved sub rosa a charge that informed the jury of its
power to nullify while also informing the jury that it would be wrongful to do so, see
id. at 60 (stating that, although "it may be in the power of the jury" to find the
defendants guilty of the lesser included crime of manslaughter, if a felonious homocide
· had been committed, there was no evidence that would reduce the crime to below that
of murder).
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actions. "163 Thus, the jury's right to a nullification instruction
derives from the necessity to inform it of its role in the judicial
process. 164
The second rights argument is a defendant-centered approach, which argues that a criminal defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial includes the possibility of a
jury acquittal. That is, since the jury has the power to acquit
against the law and facts, "the defendant cannot be deprived
of his right to an opportunity for the jury to exercise this
power." 165 Indeed, this argument is related to the first notion
that the jury's function is greater than mere discernment of the
facts in a particular case. It recognizes that the jury plays a
unique role in the judicial process independent from that of
other government actors.
Some commentators have evaluated nullification in terms of
other rights standpoints, including equal protection 166 and
other defendant-centered considerations. 167 In essence, these
approaches have de-emphasized the instruction itself in favor
of allowing the jury the evidentiary and procedural freedom to
consider nullification, whether or not they receive permission
by way of an explicit instruction.
The defendant-centered approach attempts to eliminate the
logical dilemma inherent in the power-versus-right dichotomy,
that is, the "internal contradiction of protecting the power
while negating the right. "168 Instead, one commentator proposes
that nullification be considered in the context of the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of a jury trial "not eviscerated by trial
procedures that cause the jury's verdict to mimic what the
judge's verdict would have been."169 Under this view, the jury's
ability to nullify derives from the defendant's Sixth Amendment right. As opposed to Scheflin's framework, however, this
approach argues that the defendant's rights are independent

163. Scheflin, supra note 8, at 197.
164. Id. at 198.
165. Id. at 219.
166. See George C. Christie, Lawful Departures from Legal Rules: "Jury Nullification» and Legitimated Disobedience, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1289, 1304 (1974) (arguing that
not all juries are equally aware of the power to nullify and therefore must be expressly
instructed about their authority).
167. See Chaya Weinberg-Brodt, Note, Jury Nullification and Jury Control
Procedures, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 829 (1990).
168. Id. at 866.
169. Id. at 841.
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of the jury's power to nullify. 170 The jury's ability to nullify is
"accepted as a necessary side. effect ... to a fully independent
jury," a jury which is given "unrestricted power of independence," free from controls such as directed verdicts, vacated
acquittals, juror pre-qualification, and certain prosecutorial
motions in limine. 171
Judge Weinstein proposes a judge-centered approach, in
which the locus of power shifts dramatically toward the
judge. 172 Weinstein advocates a system in which nullification
is permitted, but not fostered, by having judges occasionally
take a broad view of relevance or admit evidence bearing on
moral values which might lead to nullification. 173 This approach
turns the others on their heads because it transforms jury
decision-making independence into a process essentially controlled by the presiding judge. Under this judge-centered
approach, jury nullification would depend primarily on whether
the judge, rather than the jury, thinks it appropriate in the
first instance. There is a logical contradiction in this position.
If the jury has no inherent right to nullify independently, then
there can be no collateral right vested in a judge to allow the
jury to nullify. Indeed, a judge's "permission" to nullify is a
legal oxymoron.
As superficially compelling as the power-versus-right debate
may be, the debate assumes that nullification is a conscious act
by the jury. The power-versus-right dichotomy fails to address
the far more frequent phenomenon, in which the jury nullifies
without understanding that it is doing so, through fictions and
surrogates. 174 Because the dichotomy only considers conscious
revolt, the analysis of a nullification instruction's possible
effect is artificially constrained as well.
The defendant-centered approach makes the power-versusright debate irrelevant, but it still does not address the educational and remedial effect that explicit nullification would
have on the rest of society. Nullification not only provides the
criminal defendant with the right to an unfettered jury but also
lends greater legitimacy to the administration of justice by
enfranchising those jurors who are relatively distanced from

170.
171.
172.
a Jury
173.
174.

Id. at 866.
Id. at 866-67.
Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury "Nullification": When May and Should
Reject the Law to Do Justice, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 239 (1993).
Id. at 249-51.
See supra Part II.A
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power. Nullification, viewed this way, becomes an affirmation
of the jury as a truly democratic institution. Thus, the significance of nullification is not that it embodies some constitutional abstraction, such as the right of a suspect to be informed of
the right against self-incrimination, but rather that it provides
an inextricable link to the community's awareness of its power
and its deliberate exercise of that power.
In contrast, the dominant position in both federal and state
courts is that a jury should not be informed of its nullification
power. 175 The literature articulates numerous related but
discrete arguments against informing the jury of this power. 176
First, critics argue that informing the jury of its nullification
power is an attack upon the rule of law because it asserts the
right of individuals, rather than that of society as a whole, to
determine what lawful conduct should be. 177 Moreover, explicit
knowledge of this power would loosen any restraints upon the
jury and lead to anarchy in the courts. 178 Underlying this
position is the concern that a jury's deliberate nullification
would pose an unwarranted and undemocratic intrusion into
the legislative arena. By refusing to enforce those laws perceived to be unjust, a jury would usurp the power of the
democratically elected legislature to determine what conduct
is unlawful. 179
A second argument against informing a jury of its power to
disregard the law is that it may give free rein to the jury's
extralegal biases. Thus, a nullification instruction could lead
to acquittals or convictions based on these biases. 180

175. See, e.g., United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1007 (4th Cir. 1969) ("Sii:J.ce
the Spar{ case, the lower federal courts-even in the occasional cases in which they
may have ventured to question its wisdom-have adhered to the doctrine it affirmed
[that the jury must take the law from the court]. Furthermore, among the states, only
two still allow the jury to be told that they can disregard the law as given them by
the court.") (footnotes omitted).
176. See, e.g., Alan W. Scheflin & Jon M. Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: Contours
of a Controuersy, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 85-111 (1980) (summarizing five such
arguments: (1) it would be anarchy to give the instruction; (2) the instruction is
unnecessary; (3) the instruction is unwise; (4) the nullification power is necessary but
better left unsaid; and (5) the instruction would impair the responsibility of the juror).
177. See United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 519 (9th Cir. 1972).
178. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (noting
potential "grave dangers" to the current system, which protects against anarchy as
well as tyranny).
179. Simson, supra note 159, at 512-13.
180. See id. at 513-14; see also Irwin A. Horowitz & Thomas E. Willging, Changing
Views of Jury Power, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 165, 172-73 (1991) (reporting empirical
evidence that suggests that when given a nullification charge, juries will occasionally
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Finally, some argue that informing the jury of its power to
nullify eliminates the cost placed upon a jury wishing to do so,
which removes the built-in constraint that limits the nullification power only to extraordinary circumstances. 181 We review
these traditional objections to the nullification instruction, with
particular attention to how they fail to address issues in the
context of ordinary criminal trials.
A. Anarchy and Undemocratic Usurpation Arguments

Perhaps the most common reason articulated in opposition
to an explicit nullification charge is the belief that the jury's
knowledge of its prerogative would degrade the rule of law.
This approach misconstrues the significance of an explicit
nullification instruction: knowledge of the power to nullify is
not the power to make or decide whether the law has actually
been broken, which is a separate and reconcilable function of
a jury. Rather, the jury's knowledge of its nullification power
allows it to decide whether the application of the law to the
particular circumstances of the case before it is just. The jury
need not violate its oath to take the law as given by the court.
After deciding that the law has been broken, the jury's function
should be to determine whether the lawbreaker ought to be
punished for the behavior as instructed by the court.
Moreover, the decision whether to enforce particular laws
does not usurp legislative power. Indeed, this decision is not
legislative at all. Rather, it is a species of traditional executive
and judicial discretion. 182 Professor Scheflin argues that jury
nullification is an assessment of whether unlawful conduct
should be punished and that it therefore checks prosecutorial
indiscretion. 183 According to Scheflin, prosecutorial discretion
filters out many marginal cases, and jury nullification weeds
out the rest. 184 Yet Scheflin and others, such as Professor Jon

be more severe with "unsympatheticn defendants than the law mandates).
181. E.g., MORTIMER R. KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY 35,
59-66 (1973); see also Weinstein, supra note 172, at 250-51 (opining that the absence
of the instruction ensures that nullification will occur only in "relatively infrequent
extreme casesn).
182. Scheflin, supra note 8, at 181.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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Van Dyke, confine their analysis to political trials. According
to their analysis, in ordinary criminal trials, prosecutorial
discretion reflects community attitudes; in political trials,
where the government is the purported victim, the jury must
exercise the discretion normally residing in the prosecutor. 185
Scheflin and Van Dyke do not consider the potential effect
on verdicts of our multiracial, multicultural, and economically
stratified society, in which many groups either are or perceive
themselves to be excluded from positions which traditionally
have exercised discretion-the police, the prosecution, and the
judiciary. In particular, Scheflin and Van Dyke's conclusion
does not address the fact that the racial make-up of those
administeringjustice and that of defendants and jury greatly
diverge. For example, the Report of the New York State
Judicial Commission on Minorities concluded that "inequality,
disparate treatment and·injustice remain hallmarks of [New
York State's] justice system" and that "courts ... have lost the
confidence of the poor." 186 Scheflin and Van Dyke's premise
that official discretion in ordinary criminal trials reflects
community sentiment is therefore dubious. If community
sentiment differs from prosecutorial practice, then it is proper
for the community, through the jury, to provide a check on
prosecutorial judgment in ordinary criminal matters as well.
A jury's decision to allow a lawbreaker to go free does not
compromise the integrity of the rule oflaw any more than the
decision of an individual police officer or prosecutor not to
arrest or prosecute a lawbreaker prior to trial. 187
Professor Simson argues that informing a jury of its
nullification power would be an undemocratic usurpation of

185. See id. at 191 ("[l]n ordinary criminal trials, prosecutorial discretion tempers
harsh ... laws and forbears from instigating criminal violations not founded upon
community support.... [whereas in political trials] prosecutorial discretion no longer
acts as a buffer between the community and the law ... "); cf Jon M. Van Dyke, The
Jury As a Political Institution, 16 CATH. LAW. 224, 238 (1970) (arguing that juries in
ordinary criminal trials will not be tempted to exercise nullification powers because
the jurors are victims of crimes of violence rather than crimes of conscience).
186. 1 REPoRT OF THE NEW YORK STATE JUDICIAL CoMMISSION ON MINORITIES 1 (1991)
[hereinafter N.Y. REPORT].
187. See KENNETH C. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 1 (1975) [hereinafter POLICE
DISCRETION] (noting that the individual patrol officer decides daily "what law to enforce,
how much to enforce it, against whom, and on what occasions"); see also KENNETH C.
DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 188 (1969) [hereinafter DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE] (noting that the discretionary power in the criminal justice system that
trumps all others is the power to decide whether to prosecute).
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legislative power. 188 According to Professor Simson, nullification "frustrate[s] the people's sense of justice" since the
legislature, not the jury, reflects the majoritarian view. 189
Nullification essentially attacks democratic principles by compromising, among other things, the dispensation of equal
justice, the need for legislative reform, and the executive's
ability to implement policies on a wide scale. 190
The Ninth Circuit expressed similar views in United States
v. Simpson. 191 In Simpson, the defendant had set fire to Selective Service files to protest the United States' involvement
in Southeast Asia. 192 As in many of the war resister cases, the
defendant appealed on the ground that the trial court had
refused to inform the jury of its power to acquit regardless of
the evidence of the defendant's guilt. 193 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the conviction, reasoning that such an instruction
would strike "to the heart of our society" because what was
being proposed was "not merely that jurors should be given the
power to determine what is the law, but that they should be
instructed that they may acquit a defendant even though they
believe that he did something the law forbids. "194 The Simpson
court suggested that if a nullification instruction were given,
"we ·would have a kind of anarchy; that is, a system in which
the ultimate test of socially permissible conduct is, to a significant degree, the random reaction of a group of twelve people
selected at random. "195
Both Professor Simson and the Simpson court conflate the
notions of a general proscription and its enforcement. Nullification is not any single jury's attempt to veto the majority's
notions of impermissible conduct as expressed through the
legislature. It is simply one jury's decision that under the
particular circumstances before it, conduct that may otherwise
be generally impermissible should not be subject to sanction.
Professors Scheflin and Van Dyke refer to this authority as the
"dispensing_ power" of the jury, the "power of conscience which
permits the jury to suspend the application of a particular law

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

See Simson, supra note 159, at 512-16.
Id. at 512.
See id. at 513-16.
460 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 516.
Id. at 517.
Id. at 519 (citation omitted).
Id. at 520 n.12.
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in a particular instance to a particular defendant in the
interest of conscience and justice. "196
This is precisely the discretionary power already given to
unelected police officers and prosecutors. 197 Professors Scheflin
and Van Dyke argue that the police have the discretion not to
arrest; that the prosecutors have the discretion whether or not
to bring criminal charges; and that the trial judges have the
discretion whether or not to allow cases to proceed to trial. 198
Thus, in many instances these actors may act to "temper the
rigor of the law" despite a technical violation of that law. 199 In
fact, by appropriating only one-half to two-thirds of the funds
and personnel necessary to achieve full enforcement, legislatures have acquiesced to the discretionary enforcement of
statutes by the government. 200
The full contour of the nullification debate can best be seen
in United States v. Dougherty. 201 In Dougherty, the defendants
appealed convictions for destroying Dow Chemical Company
property. At trial, the defendants contended that they destroyed the property to protest the Vietnam War and Dow's
support of United States military efforts. 202 On appeal, they
argued that the trial judge improperly refused to instruct the
jury of its right to acquit the defendants without regard to the
law and further refused to allow the defendants to argue this
issue to the jury. 203
In affirming the trial court, Judge Leventhal stated that "the
simultaneous achievement of modest jury equity and avoidance
ofintolerable caprice depends upon formal instructions that do
not expressly delineate a jury charter to carve out its own rules

196. Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 176, at 87 (arguing that this dispensing
power is not the power to make, redefine, supplant, or overrule the law).
197. See DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 187, at 190 ("The prosecutor has more
control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in America.") (quoting
Justice Robert H. Jackson, Federal Trial Rules Simulate State Reform, 24 J. AM. Jun.
Soc. 18, 18-19 (1940)); Weinstein, supra note 172, at 246-47 ("By far the greatest
nullification takes place as a result of decisions not to prosecute or reduce charges ....
(P]rosecutors have enormous discretion because of the great number of crimes found
in our over-expansive criminal laws.").
198. Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 176, at 87.
199. Id.
200. POLICE DISCRETION, supra note 187, at 80-81; see also Scheflin & Van Dyke,
supra note 176, at 112 (arguing that the generality of the laws written by legislatures
necessitates the exercise of prosecutorial discretion).
201. 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
202. See id. at 1120.
203. Id. at 1117.
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of law."204 According to Judge Leventhal, to notify the juror of
the nullification power, "is to inform him, in effect, that it is
he who fashions the rule that condemns."205 Thus, an explicit
nullification instruction "conveys an implied approval that runs
the risk of degrading the legal structure requisite for true
freedom, for an ordered liberty that protects against anarchy
as well as tyranny." 206
In his. dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Bazelon sought to
correct the majority's characterization of jury nullification by
emphasizing that it is the legislature's function
to define and proscribe certain behavior that is generally
considered blameworthy .... [However,] [t]he drafters of
legal rules cannot anticipate and take account of every case
where a defendant's conduct is "unlawful" but not blameworthy, any more than they can draw a bold line to mark
the boundary between an accident and negligence. It is the
jury-as spokesman for the community's sense of values.,...-that must explore that subtle and elusive boundary. 207
Judge Bazelon's dissent suggests the importance of the
nullification instruction to ensure community input in enforcing the law. This species of jury discretion may have positive
societal as well as legal value. Many communities perceive that
the legal system dispenses justice inequitably, and this perception is grounded in a disgraceful reality. For example, the
Report of the New York State Judicial Commission on Minorities found that "a general public perception of bias" in the New
York state courts exists because "[v]estiges of long-standing
discrimination" against people of color "pervade their ... perceptions of their ability to achieve justice."208 Furthermore, as
of 1991, out of a total of 1129 New York state judges, only 93
are members of minority groups. 209 Moreover, the Commission
found that, in 1989, whites comprised eighty-two percent of
New York court's nonjudicial employees 210 and that minorities

204. Id. at 1134.
205. Id. at 1136.
206. Id. at 1137.
207. Id. at 1140 & n.5, 1142 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
208. 1 N.Y. REPORT, supra note 186, at 27.
209. Id. at 94. Seventy-one African Americans, 19 Latinos, and 3 Asian Americans
comprised the 8.2% of judges who were minorities. Id.
210. Id. at 116.
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were underrepresented as attorneys, court officers, junior court
analysts, court reporters, and court clerks. 211 Statistics like
these have led Franklin H. Williams, Chairperson of the
Commission on Minorities, to conclude that "there is more here
than just the perception of a biased court system. There is in
New York State in the 1990's the reality of a biased court
system."212
According to the New York Law Journal, in 1994, of 1167
trial and appellate judges in New York, only 125 were minorities.213 This figure indicates that even with an apparent effort
over the last three years to increase minority representation
on the bench, the gap between whites and minorities remains
substantial. Indeed, while the majority of the population of
Brooklyn and Queens are people of color, the same is true of
less than twenty percent of the judges in each borough. 214
Thus, the community's lack of knowledge that it has the
authority to check inequitable law enforcement and prosecutorial discretion through nullification is more than an academic
problem. 215 This ignorance may reinforce the community's sense
of powerlessness and erode its respect for the law and the
criminal justice system. 216 The law will ultimately be strengthened, not weakened, by acknowledging the check on police and
prosecutorial discretion given to the jury as a representative
body, because society thus gains community oversight of the
conduct of governmental officials.

211. Id. at 105.
212. Id. at vii.
213. Today's News, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 3, 1994, at 1 (discussing a report by the Association of Hispanic Judges and the Judicial Friends which places this figure at 11 %).
214. Id.; see also David Johnston, Bias Found in Choosing of Justices, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 6, 1994, at Bl, B4 (reporting that as of July 1994, 90% of the appointed judges
on the bench in Manhattan, Brooklyn, and the Bronx were white and that 73% of the
elected judges sitting on the New York Supreme Court in these boroughs were white).
215. Cf Scheflin, supra note 8, at 190 ("[P)articipation on the jury gives the people
a feeling of greater involvement in their government which further legitimizes that
government.").
216. Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 176, at 103 (noting that a nullification
instruction "would give the jurors a sense of responsibility, respect, and influence over
the law that regulates their lives"). Scheflin and Van Dyke assert, however, that in
the ordinary criminal case nullification is unlikely because "people [like themselves)
are victims of these crimes." Id. While we agree that juries are less likely to nullify
when violent crimes have been committed against other members of the community,
we nevertheless believe that, as the racial makeup of criminal defendants has become
overwhelmingly different from that of the majority of the police, prosecution, and
judiciary, the minority community's trust in the justice system has waned but that
it may be reinforced with increased input from the community.
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A recent New York Times I WCBS News poll found that, out
of all city residents polled, minority group residents most
strongly expressed skepticism about the New York City Police
Department. 217 The poll found that a majority of African
American and Latino respondents, as well as a "sizable minority" of white respondents, believed that the New York City police
were generally tougher on people of color. 218 This criticism is
not without a rational basis. For example, in New York City,
a city in which over fifty-three percent of the population is
either African American or Latino, members of both groups
account for only twenty-five percent of the police force. 219
Moreover, ninety-three percent of the sergeants are white, and,
as of April 1994, not a single African American had attained
the rank of captain. 220 There are similar disparities in other
cities where the non-Caucasian population is in the majority,
including Chicago, 221 Los Angeles, 222 and Houston. 223 Detroit is
the only major city in which a majority of police officers are
people of color, although the discrepancy remains substantial
between their representation on the police force and their share
of the population. 224
As a popular check on executive and judicial discretion, the
nullification instruction would inject more democracy into the
justice system, rather than usurp its influence, and would
serve as a direct reminder from the bench that one of the
purposes of the jury is to reflect community values. A nullification instruction would reemphasize to the jury, and to the
actors in the entire criminal justice system, why we do not
employ professional fact finders in criminal cases and why we
have a constitutional right to a trial by jury. Perhaps most
importantly, a carefully crafted nullification instruction would
allow the community to exercise its role as overseer consciously
and deliberately, rather than through fictions and surrogates.
It would create the incentive to deliberate openly about the
merits of the evidence and would remove the inclination to

217. Clifford Krauss, Poll Finds a Lack of Faith in Police, N.Y. TIMES, June 19,
1994, at Al, B30.
218. Id. at B30.
219. Peter T. Kilborn, New York Police Force Lagging in Recruitment of Black
Officers, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1994, at 1, 26.
220. Id. at 1.
221. Approximately 56% of the population and 32% of the police force. Id. at 26.
222. Approximately 54% of the population and 37% of the police force. Id.
223. Approximately 56% of the population and 27% of the police force. Id.
224. Approximately 78% of the population and 59% of the police force. Id.
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disguise nullification sentiment as fact finding. As a result, the
instruction would enable jurors to focus on the evidence
without hindering their ability to question frankly and freely
the propriety of the prosecution.

B. Bias-determined Outcomes
Another frequently expressed objection to a nullification
instruction is that it would give freer rein to juror biases,
thereby producing convictions or acquittals based upon improper prejudice. 225 This position ignores procedural protections
against convictions not supported by the evidence, such as the
defendant's right to appeal and the trial court's power to vacate
convictions.
The position is also illogical. To illustrate, in Dougherty,
Judge Bazelon responded to the argument that "the spontaneous and unsolicited act of nullification" will more likely
reflect bias than lack of instruction as follows:
It seems substantially more plausible to me to assume that
the very opposite is true. The juror motivated by prejudice
seems to me more likely to make spontaneous use of the
power to nullify, and more likely to disregard the judge's
exposition of the normally controlling legal standards. The
conscientious juror, who could make a careful effort to
consider the blameworthiness of the defendant's action in
light of prevailing community values, is the one most likely
to obey the judge's admonition that the jury enforce strict
principles of law. 226
Thus, a carefully crafted nullification instruction, one that
informs the jury of its discretion to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and yet to acquit on the basis that justice is
better served by not convicting the offender, would actually
offer protection against bias. 227
225. Cf Simson, supra note 159, at 514 ("[Bly activating local biases, jury nullification may at times in effect immunize criminal acts visited upon members of society's
'discrete and insular minorities.'").
226. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon,
C.J., dissenting).
227. According to Judge Bazelon:
[I)t is hard . . . to see how a nullification instruction could enhance the
likelihood of [an unjust conviction) .... The instruction would speak in terms of
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Finally, while some abuses inevitably do occur in the jury
room, to the extent that jurors represent a fair cross-section of
the community, the likelihood that a particular bias will
improperly influence the jury to convict or acquit will decrease. 228 Scheflin notes that the spectre that white juries
would convict black defendants and acquit white defendants
solely out of racial prejudice lessens as the presence of disenfranchised groups in the administration of justice increases. 229
Thus, the solution to bias in the jury system is not avoidance
of a nullification instruction but education of and greater
participation by the entire community. 230
A properly crafted nullification instruction would create a
better environment in which to expose and confront social
biases during deliberation. At present, the availability of
surrogates for the jury's own concepts of justice provides cover
acquittal, not conviction, and it would provide no comfort to a juror determined
to convict a defendant in defiance of the law or the facts of the case. Indeed,
unless the jurors ignored the nullification instruction they could not convict on
the grounds of prejudice alone. Does the judge's recitation of the instruction
increase the likelihood that the jury will ignore the limitation that lies at its
heart? I hardly think so.
As for the problem of unjust acquittal, ... [w]here defendants seem dangerous,
juries are unlikely to exercise their nullification power, whether or not an explicit
instruction is offered. Of course, that check will not prevent the acquittal of a
defendant who may be blameworthy and dangerous except in the jaundiced eyes
of a jury motivated by a perverse and sectarian sense of values. But whether a
nullification instruction would make such acquittals more common is problematical, if not entirely inconceivable. In any case, the real problem in this situation
is not the nullification doctrine, but the values and prejudice that prompt the
acquittal. And the solution is not to condemn the nullification power, but to
spotlight the prejudice and parochial values that underlie the verdict in the hope
that the public outcry will force re-examination of those values, and deter their
implementation in subsequent cases.

Id. at 1143 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
228. The issue of whether juries fairly represent a cross-section of most communities is an important issue but is beyond the scope of this Article. For discussion on
the underrepresentation of minority jurors, see 1 N.Y. REPORT, supra note 186, at
53-59 (reporting that African-American and other minority communities are either
not welcome or actually excluded from New York state jury pools); Deborah A.
Ramirez, Excluded Voices: The Disenfranchisement of Ethnic Groups from Jury
Service, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 761 (concluding that Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352
(1991), which upheld the exclusion of bilingual Latinos on the basis that these jurors
would not adhere solely to the official English translation of Spanish testimony, could
potentially exclude all bilingual Latino jurors in cases where Spanish testimony could
be brought before the court); Joseph P. Fried, Bias Charged in Selection of U.S. Juries,
N.Y. Times, June 2, 1994, at Bl, B2 (discussing the controversy surrounding the
Eastern District of New York's practice of using predominately white, Long Island
juror pools for cases tried in Brooklyn, while using only Long Island-based jurors for
cases tried on Long Island).
229. Scheflin, supra note 8, at 212.
230. Id.
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for juror biases. A nullification instruction would offer less
incentive to conceal prejudices or to exercise prejudice by
raising false collateral issues.

C. Nullification Power Only in
Extraordinary Circumstances
A third objection to informing a jury of its nullification
power posits that "nullification which arises out of ignorance
is in some sense more worthy than nullification which arises
out of knowledge." 231 That is, the jury has a "recourse role,"
the authority to reevaluate and go beyond procedural constraints when these constraints are perceived to conflict with
goals. 232 The difference between a recourse role and unfettered
discretion, however, is that the former imposes a cost upon the
body wishing to redefine its constraints. By not informing the
jury of its nullification power, the cost limits the exercise of
the power to extraordinary circumstances, which reflects the
proper application of the nullification power. 233
The difficulty with this position, asserted by Professors
Mortimer and Sanford Kadish, is that it assumes that the
proper limits on the exercise of the nullification power are
dictated by the jury's ignorance. Meanwhile, there is reason to
believe that a conscious decision on the part of a jury to

231. Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1141 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting); see also KADISH &
KADISH, supra note 181, at 59-66.

232. Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 176, at 99 (defining "recourse role" as "the
authority to reexamine the constraints .... when those constraints appear to conflict
with the goals they were set up to further"); see also KADISH & KADISH, supra note
181, at 65 (positing that "an explicit statement that the jury may invoke their own
values ... would ... invite jury nullification on a greater scale").
233. Id. at 64-65; cf. Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1136-37. In Dougherty, the court
suggested that
it is pragmatically useful to structure instructions in such wise [sic] that the
jury must feel strongly about the values involved in the case, so strongly that
it must itself identify the case as establishing a call of high conscience ....
[This] confines the happening of the lawless jury to the occasional instance that
does not violate, and viewed as an exception may even enhance, the over-all
normative effect of the rule of law.
Id. at 1136-37 (footnote omitted). See also KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 6, at 498
("Perhaps one reason why the jury exercises its very real power so sparingly is because it is officially told it has none.").
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exercise its nullification power, guided by appropriate instructions, would not impose a cost and may even confer a benefit. 234 Moreover, this position evidences a basic mistrust of the
way jurors approach their task, of their collective common
sense and moral judgment, and consequently, of the jury
system itself. 235 Indeed, by creating an atmosphere where
juries deliberate fully and carefully about whether any issue
other than a defendant's legal guilt should be considered,
jurors might be less inclined to succumb to bias because such
bias would be met by prosecutorial counterargument and the
critical response of the other members of the jury.·
The empirical evidence supports our hypothesis. In experimental studies conducted by Professor Irwin Horowitz, mock
juries were given explicit nullification instructions and standard nonnullification'instructions. 236 Professor Horowitz found
that prosecutorial challenges made to nullification arguments
counterbalanced and sufficiently curbed juror bias. 237 Thus, a
nullification instruction that imposes procedural constraints
on the power to nullify and allows substantive challenges to its

234. See Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1141-43 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (placing trust
in the jury not to abuse their power upon receipt of a nullification instruction).
235. Cf id. at 1142.
236. Irwin A. Horowitz, The Effect ofJury Nullification Instruction on Verdicts and
Jury Functioning in Criminal Trials, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 25, 30-32 (1985). The
Horowitz juries deliberated three different scenarios: felony murder, vehicular
homicide involving drunk driving, and euthanasia. Different juries were given
different instructions: a standard nonnullification instruction, a Maryland instruction
containing a nullification charge, or a "Radical Nullification Instruction," in which
jurors were told that they had the power to decide whether to apply a given law, that
it was appropriate to bring their conscience and that of the community into the
deliberations, and that nothing would bar an acquittal if the jury felt that a conviction
would produce inequitable or unjust results. Id. Horowitz found that the acquittal
rates for juries given the standard nonnullification instruction or the Maryland
instruction did not differ substantially. Id. at 32-34. In fact, there is no evidence that
Maryland has greater or fewer instances of nullification than any other state. Id.
However, Horowitz later concluded that when juries were given the Radical Nullification Instruction they were more likely to acquit a sympathetic defendant, judge a
dangerous defendant more harshly, and spend less time on the evidence and more on
defendant characteristics. See Horowitz, infra note 237, at 451-52. This result does
not mean receipt of a nullification instruction liberates the jury from the constraints
of instructions per se. Indeed, given the wording of the Radical Nullification Instruction, an argument could be made that the mock juries were diligently following the
instructions given. For a discussion of the various instructions used in the Horowitz
studies, see infra notes 273-75 and accompanying text.
237. Irwin A. Horowitz, Jury Nullification: The Impact of Judicial Instructions,
Arguments and ChallengesonJuryDecisionMaking, 12 LAW &HUM. BEHAV. 439, 451
(1988) ("The impact of challenges to nullification arguments depressed juries'
tendencies to act upon their sentiments.").
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application would levy the kind of cost that the Kadishes
believe is required for the proper exercise of nullification. An
instruction which informs the jury of its nullification power,
but at the same time conveys the expectation that the jury
must follow the law to reach its verdict, would likely minimize
the number of nullifications. 238
A nullification instruction that commands the jury to consider the evidence and decide the guilt of the defendant before
considering issues of justice would both inform the jury of the
parameters of deliberation and impose constraints upon the
their discretion to nullify. One commentator has suggested that
a nullification instruction is "like telling children not to put
beans in their noses. Most of them would not have thought of
it had it not been suggested."239 But, just as many parents will
attest that there need be no prompting for children to push
small objects into their nostrils and ears, so too do recent
events and anecdotal and empirical evidence suggest that
juries do think about and act upon their nullification impulses
more than has been traditionally acknowledged. 240 We do not
leave the dispensation of justice to children. Moreover, we
leave it to juries composed of concerned and intelligent adults
who are sensitive to the need for justice.
IV. ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE NULLIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS

There have been various attempts to introduce a nulllfication
instruction to the modernjury process, both in actual cases and
under simulated conditions. 241 Two states, Maryland and Indiana, currently permit nullification instructions. 242 These states
have been viewed as laboratories, allowing scholars to study

238. See Stephen R. Mysliwiec, Note, Toward Principles of Jury Equity, 83 YALE
L.J. 1023, 1051-52 (1974); see also Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1141 (Bazelon, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the conscientious juror who will carefully consider the
blameworthiness of the defendant is the one most likely to obey the judge's admonition
to enforce the law).
239. Weinstein, supra note 172, at 250.
240. See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) ("Surely nothing is gained by the pretense that the jurors
lack the power to nullify, since that pretense deprives them of the opportunity to hear
the very instruction that might compel them to confront their responsibility.").
241. See infra Part IV.A-B.
'
242. See infra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.
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the actual effect of nullification instructions on the outcome of
real cases. 243 However, given a number of factors, most importantly the wording of the nullification instruction, such studies
are not particularly instructive in understanding the actual
effects of an instruction on a deliberating jury. Notwithstanding the nullification language in the charges, we are not
convinced that Maryland and Indiana juries have been provided with the clear opportunity to nullify which comes from a
real understanding of the power to nullify. 244
A number of other states had bills pending in their legislatures which would permit nullification instructions. 245 Some of
the language proposed in these bills differs markedly from that
currently employed in Maryland and Indiana. Until these bills
are enacted, 246 however, there will be no empirical evidence by
which to determine the effects of these instructions either.
It is helpful at this point to restate that the fundamental
purposes of a nullification instruction are to inform a jury of
its power to acquit a defendant notwithstanding a clear factual
finding of guilt and to inform the jury of its power to import
243. See Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 176, at 80-85 (analyzing jury nullification in the Maryland and Indiana courts); cf. Gary J. Jacobsohn, The Right to
Disagree: Judges, Juries, and the Administration of Criminal Justice in Maryland,
1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 571, 577-79 (noting counsel's role in providing interpretations
of law to Maryland juries); M. Kristine Creagan, Note, Jury Nullification: Assessing
Recent Legislative Developments, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1101, 1130-36 (1993)
(discussing the practical effects of nullification instructions on trial outcomes in
Maryland and Indiana).
244. See Horowitz, supra note 236, at 29 ("Proponents of the nullification doctrine
feel that the Maryland instruction is too vaguely worded to have a substantial
impact.n).
245. See, e.g., H.B. 5248, Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Conn. 1995) ("[I]f a juror finds
the law to be unjust or wrongly applied to the defendant such juror may exercise the
traditional right of jurors to vote according to conscience regardless of the facts of the
case ... .n); S. 4157, 218th Gen. Assembly, let Reg. Sees. (N.Y. 1995) ("Upon request
of a defendant, the court must also state that the jury has the final authority to decide
whether or not to apply the law to the facts before it, that it is appropriate to bring
into its deliberations the feelings of the community and its own feelings based on conscience, and that nothing would bar the jury from acquitting the defendant if it feels
that the law, as applied to the facts, would produce an inequitable or unjust result.n);
H.B. 296, 54th Legis. Sess. (Mont. 1995) (defining the right to ajury trial as including
the right to inform the jury of its power to judge both law and facts as well as to vote
according to conscience); cf H.B. 2514, 74th Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1995) (creating a right
in the defendant to inform the jury ofits nullification power, explicitly forbidding the
court or the State to infringe on that right, and providing that the failure to allow the
defendant to exercise this right is grounds for mistrial).
246. As of the time of this Article's publication, none of the bills cited, supra note
245, have been enacted. The Connecticut bill was rejected in committee. The Montana
bill had passed the house committee but failed to pass on the floor. The New York and
Texas bills are still awaiting action.
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its own concept of justice into its deliberation. A nullification
instruction must serve the purposes both ofjury empowerment
and of a rational, deliberative process. The proposed instructions from the literature and the courts fall short of the second
purpose; while they inform the jury of its power to nullify, they
do not provide the jury with any guidance to nullify in a
rational way.

A. The Maryland Charge and Empirical Studies
The Constitution of Maryland states that, "[i]n the trial of
all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well
as of fact, except that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency
of the evidence to sustain a conviction."247 In Maryland, the
typical jury instruction regarding the jury's proper role reads
as follows:
Members of the Jury, this is a criminal case and under the
Constitution and the laws of the State of Maryland in a
criminal case the jury are the judges of the law as well as
of the facts in the case. So that whatever I tell you about
the law while it is intended to be helpful to you in reaching
a just and proper verdict in the case, it is not binding upon
you as members of the jury and you may accept or reject
it. And you may apply the law as you apprehend it to be in
the case. 248
The empirical studies of jury nullification in the Maryland
courts have been inconclusive as to the effect of such an
instruction. 249 There has been no showing that such an instruc247. MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights art. 23 (amended 1992). Similarly, the
Indiana state constitution provides: "In all criminal cases .. : the jury shall have the
right to determine the law and the facts." IND. CONST. art. I,§ 19. As previously noted,
a number of other states have recently considered legislation which would similarly
grant the jury the power and the right to pass upon the law as well as the facts. See
legislative bills cited supra note 245 and accompanying text.
248. See Wyleyv. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 372 F.2d 742, 743 n.1 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 863 (1967).
249. See Jacobsohn, supra note 243, at582-600 (finding that 47. 7% of polled judges
believe that the nullification instruction has no observable impact on Maryland
verdicts). Jacobsohn's methodology relied exclusively on judges as reporters; it did not
factor in other constraints on the trial process such as jury control mechanisms and
evidentiary rulings. See id. at 583. Without factoring in other means by which the
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tion has resulted in substantial disruption in the administration ofjustice. 250 Specifically, studies have shown that judicial
disagreement with jury verdicts is only marginally greater in
Maryland than it is nationwide. 251
Unfortunately, and perhaps inevitably, the greatest difficulty
in evaluating the empirical effects of such an instruction
involves the sample of trials selected. This is not merely an
issue of methodology, which is itself highly problematic, 252 but
one of the overall effects that a legitimized jury nullification
will have on a state's criminal justice system, jury control
practices, and legal culture. 253 For example, if certain cases

court controlled the trial process, we cannot know whether the failure of a given jury
to nullify was due to (1) a direct rejection of nullification on the merits, (2) a failure
of the jury to appreciate the nullification power contained in the Maryland instructions, or (3) a trial that by judicial rulings, evidentiary and otherwise, was cleansed
of all facts and arguments that might incline a jury to nullify.
250. Id. at 589.
251. Id. at 585; see also Samuel K. Dennis, Maryland's Antique Constitutional
Thorn, 92 U. PA. L. REV. 34, 39 (1943) (explaining that Maryland criminal trials
proceed with "fair success and justice" due to the excellence of Maryland jurors and
the narrow scope of their duties).
252. Although the statistical results of these studies use relatively neutral characterizations, such as "juror agreement" or "juror disagreement" with the judge, these
studies are based upon the assumption that the judge is a reliable reporter. See, e.g.,
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 6, at 50-54. However, a subsequent study by Baldwin
and McConville has questioned that assumption. John Baldwin & Michael Mcconville,
Trial by Jury: Some Empirical Evidence on Contested Criminal Cases in England, 13
LAW & Soc. REV. 861 (1979). In this study, all trial participants, including judges,
defense lawyers, the prosecution, and police witnesses, evaluated the trials in which
they had participated. The results in each case varied widely from reporter to reporter.
See id. at 865-71. Sociologist Martha Myers, relying largely on interviews with actual
jurors, has shed additional light on the reasons for jurors' "rule departures." See
generally Martha A. Myers, Rule Departures and Making Law: Juries and Their
Verdicts, 13 LAW & Soc. REV. 781 (1979) (finding that rule departures reflect not only
a concern about the defendant's behavior but also about the choices of the victim and
the seriousness of the prosecution's charge).
The most tendentious part of most experimental jury studies is the use of the minitrial. By subjecting the mock jury to a proceeding no more than a few hours in length,
as opposed to a trial which can last anywhere from a few days to many months, and
because of the inevitable influence that editing choices and camera work have on the
viewer, certain highlighted "events" tend to loom larger in the jurors' minds. Stretched
memories, boredom, the sheer volume of information, and the tendency of a real jury
to view the courtroom experience through a wider lens go untested in simulated
studies. Because of the miniaturization of the trial experience, certain tested events
tend to exert a greater effect on the overall outcome than might otherwise be the case.
Additionally, simulatedjuryfindings may not necessarily be generalized to complex
situations in which numerous variables affect jurors and the verdicts actually affect
a defendant's life. See V. Lee Hamilton, Obedience and Responsibility: A Jury
Simulation, 36 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. 126, 128-30 (1978); Myers, supra, at
794-95.
253. See generally KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY, 349-73 (1987)

(discussing how judges, prosecutors, and police may ameliorate the potentially unjust
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involving classes of crimes, such as sumptuary crimes, de
minimis violations, and petty offenses, are viewed by the police
as more likely to result in nullification acquittals, then the
police might exercise more discretion in effectuating or booking
arrests in these cases. 254 A similar calculation by a prosecutor
may result in a dismissal of the charges or a "low-ball" plea
bargain to resolve the case at an early stage rather than to risk
a nullification acquittal. Similarly,judges may not wish to clog
their trial calendars with cases more likely to result in acquittals; they in turn, will pressure prosecutors either to dismiss
the charges or to accept pleas to lesser offenses. Subject to
statutory and state constitutional constraints, judges may
dismiss cases "in furtherance of justice" over the prosecutor's
objection. 255 The factors that the court considers in evaluating

application oflaw); JEROME HALL, THEFT, LAW & SocIETY 80-92 (2d ed. 1952) (discussing
the development of common law offenses into statutory offenses); William W. Fisher
III, Ideology, Religion and Constitutional Protection of Private Property, 39 EMORY L.J.
65, 121-31 (1990) (celebrating nullification of the fugitive slave laws by judges
through sentencing, directed verdicts, and evidentiary findings); Scheflin, supra note
8, at 181 (discussing amelioration through reduction of charges, declining to prosecute,
and dismissing cases); Weinstein, supra, note 172, at 246 (noting police discretion in
declining to arrest assailants in domestic abuse cases). However, none of these sources
has explored the possible effect that a nullification instruction would have on the
exercise of discretion by the other participants, namely jurors, in the criminal justice
system.
254. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 140.20(4) (McKinney 1992) (requiring the
release of a suspect from custody based on a lack of reasonable cause to detain at any
time prior to bringing the suspect before the· court).
255. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 210.40(1) (McKinney 1993) (permitting as
a matter of judicial discretion the dismissal of an indictment "in the furtherance of
justice" because of the existence of a "compelling factor, consideration or circumstance"); see also People v. Clayton, 342 N.Y.S.2d 106 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) (creating
a "Clayton Dismissal" which allows dismissal of charges in response to a defendant's
motion pursuant to § 210.40(1)). The Clayton court listed a number of issues which
should be considered when determining the "interests of justice" in a particular case.
Id. at 110; After Clayton, § 210.40(1) was amended to list explicitly factors which a
court should consider in reviewing a motion brought under§ 210.40(1). These factors
are:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)

(g)
(h)

the seriousness and circumstances of the offense;
the extent of harm caused by the offense;
the evidence of guilt, whether admissible or inadmissible at trial;
the history, character and condition of the defendant;
any exceptionally serious misconduct of law enforcement personnel
in the investigation, arrest and prosecution of the defendant;
the purpose and effect of imposing upon the defendant a sentence
authorized for the offense;
the impact of a dismissal upon the confidence of the public in the
criminal justice system;
the impact of a dismissal on the safety or welfare of the community;
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when to dismiss in the furtherance of justice fit the prosecutorial and judge-driven amelioration and nullification models
quite closely. In each of these circumstances, however, cases
that would otherwise go to trial and be subject to a nullification charge never go before the jury. Thus, whatever lessons
we might learn from the verdicts of the nullification cases that
ultimately go to trial and are acquitted are difficult to surmise.
Just as significantly, in cases where judges find no issue of
justice or judicial economy that would warrant dismissal or a
reduction of the charges, jury control mechanisms and evidentiary rulings during trial often will minimize the effect of
a nullification charge. 256 Judicial discretion thus may work to
keep away from the jury the sorts of facts and arguments that
might otherwise incline jurors to nullify. Under such circumstances, the nullification instruction may be of no real benefit
to the defendant or to the deliberation process. In such cases,
we cannot know what effect the nullification instruction could
have had.
Lastly, petty offenses, de minimis violations, and sumptuary
crimes are often misdemeanors which carry a maximum
sentence of less than six months. 257 Charged with such a
misdemeanor, a criminal defendant has no right guaranteed
by the Federal Constitution to a jury trial, 258 and many states
do not provide statutory or constitutional guarantees of a jury

(i)

(j)

where the court deems it appropriate, the attitude of the complainant
or victim with respect to the motion;
any other relevant fact indicating that a judgment of conviction
would serve no useful purpose.

Id. § 210.40(1)(a}-(j).
256. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 403 (designating the judge as the sole arbiter of
"relevant evidence," defined as evidence "having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence"). In determining admissibility,
relevant evidence "may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Id. Surely, the judge's power to limit the admission of evidence under
Rule 403 can serve to exclude facts that, while relevant to a nullification argument,
might "confuse the issues" or "mislead the jury. n
257. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(4) (McKinney 1987) (defining the term
"misdemeanor").
258. Dyke v. Taylor Implement Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968), noted in Baldwin v. New
York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (holding that offenses punishable by a maximum of six
months incarceration are "petty" and thus do not fall within the ambit of the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial for serious offenses).

912

Univen;ity of Michigan Joumol of Law Reform

[VOL. 28:4

trial for such crimes. 259 Thus, many types of crimes which
would warrant nullification260 are tried before the bench and
not before juries.
These practices do not discount in any way the indirect
effects that a standard nullification instruction might have on
the exercise oflaw enforcement and prosecutorial andjudicial
discretion even in cases that will never go to trial. The feedback that a nullification instruction would provide would be a
real virtue, a kind of prior restraint on prosecutorial and law
enforcement overzealousness and abuse. 261 However, this
indirect application would make interpretation of trial statistics alone extremely problematic.
The precise wording of the nullification instruction itself may
determine whether the jury chooses to exercise its power. 262 For
example, nothing in the Maryland instruction allows the judge
to marshal facts from the case to remind the jury of what
evidence might be relevant to nullification. 263 Neither does the
Maryland instruction link the jury's power to the law charged
in the case. 264 No mention is made as to what kinds of considerations should help the jury come to a just and proper
verdict; for example, the jµry is not invited to import into its
deliberations the conscience of the community or its own sense
of what is just and fair. 265 In the absence of any particular
invitation or direction, all that comes from the bench that
would purportedly assist the jury in reaching its verdict is the
judge's instructions on the law. Arguably, it is fair to say that
only a very independent and intelligent jury would have the
wherewithal to extract any practical meaning from the standard Maryland nullification instruction without additional
clarification.
Indeed, if not from the bench, any additional clarification
could otherwise come only from the evidence itself or from the
259. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 18; People v. Epps, 243 N.Y.S.2d 833, 834-35
(N.Y. Special & Trial Term 1963).
260. See supra notes 253-56 and accompanying text.
261. See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 18-19
(1910) (claiming that (j)ury lawlessness is the "great corrective" in the administration
of law); Scheflin, supra note 8, at 181-82 (advocating that jury discretion may be a
useful check on prosecutorial indiscretion because "[n]o system oflaw can withstand
the full application of its principles untempered by considerations of justice, fairness
and mercy").
262. See Horowitz, supra note 236, at 29.
263. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
264. Id.
265. Id.

SUMMER 1995]

Jury Nullification in a New Context

913

arguments of the attorneys. However, the judge has broad
discretion to preclude evidence and arguments which the judge
deems irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible. 266 Consequently,
a nullification instruction like the Maryland charge merely
redefines the problem of whether to inform the jury of its
power to nullify; it does not solve the problem. The Maryland
instruction merely hints to the jury that it has the power to
ignore the judge's instructions. Without further direction,
without relevant evidence on the issue of justice, and without
the attorney's arguments about that justice, the jury remains
uninformed about when to use its power. Under such circumstances, it is no surprise that the incidence of nullification
hardly varies from cases in which no such instruction is given.
Without a more coherent and informative instruction, not
only will the jury remain in the dark about its power, but they
more likely will become confused rather than educated. 267
Confusion may arise particularly when instructions of general
applicability conflict with the nullification instruction. In sum,
a standard jury instruction patterned after the Maryland model
is neither an invitation to "anarchy"268 nor to "equity,"269 but
rather a source of potential confusion. 270

B. The Horowitz Studies and the Effect
of Nullification Instructions
The effects of nullification instructions and their wording
was the subject of mock jury studies conducted in the 1980s,
the most well-known of which was conducted by Professor
Irwin Horowitz. 271 In his first study, Professor Horowitz divided
forty-five, six-person juries into nine experimental groups.
Each group listened to an audiotape of a mock trial and then

266. See supra note 256.
267. For a discussion on jury confusion with instructions from the bench, see
JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 110-14 (1949). The fact thatMarylandjuryverdicts
are apparently unaffected by the instruction may be a function of its vagueness or its
ambiguous language.
268. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1133-34 CD.C. Cir. 1972).
269. KAI.VEN & ZEISEL, supra note 6, at 9 ("[O)ne man's equity is another man's
anarchy.").
270. See id. at 229-31 (discussing cases in which juries departed from the formal
rule of law).
271. See Horowitz, supra note 236; Horowitz, supra note 237.
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received instructions on the law. Horowitz provided three
different trials and three different types of instructions, such
that no two of the nine groups saw the same trial nor heard
the same instruction. 272
The three trials concerned euthanasia, felony murder, and
vehicular homicide. 273 The three instructions were: (1) a standard pattern instruction informing jurors that they were the
arbiters of the facts only and that they must apply the law as
given; (2) the Maryland nullification instruction; and (3) the
"Radical Nullification Instruction," based on a proposal by
Professor Jon Van Dyke. 274 The Radical Nullification Instruction advised jurors of the following:
1.

Although they are a public body bound to give respectful attention to the laws, they have the final authority
to decide whether or not to apply a given law to the
acts of the defendant on trial before them;

2.

That they represent (the community) and that it is
appropriate to bring into their deliberations the feelings of the community and their own feelings based on
conscience;

3.

And, jurors were told that despite their respect for the
law, nothing would bar them from acquitting the
defendant if they feel that the law, as applied to the ·
fact situation before them, would produce an inequitable or unjust result. 275

Juries that were instructed by the standard pattern jury
instruction or the Maryland nullification instruction had
comparable verdict patterns, with only a slight variation in
results for the euthanasia case. 276 Juries given the Radical
Nullification Instruction, however, came out with a significantly higher number of acquittals on the euthanasia case and a
higher number of convictions on the drunk driving case. 277

272. See Horowitz, supra note 236, at 30-32.
273. Id. at 31.
274. Id. at 30-31 (noting that the standard pattern instruction was taken from
the 1974 Ohio Jury Instructions).
275. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing Van Dyke, supra note 185, at 241).
276. Id. at 32.
277. Id. at 32, 35.
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Observation of the deliberations revealed that those juries
which were instructed either by the pattern charge or by the
Maryland nullification instruction did not seem to have any
markedly different appreciation of their power .to nullify. 278
However, the juries that were given the Radical Nullification
Instruction spent more time discussing the meaning of those
instructions, less time discussing the evidence, and more time
discussing the personal characteristics of the defendant, the
jurors' own personal experiences relevant to the case, and
general issues of justice. 279 Apparently, juries that heard an
explicit instruction inviting them to exercise their power to
nullify deliberate differently than juries that are not so instructed. Such deliberations may also result in different
verdicts in some cases and do not necessarily benefit the
defendant. 280
Unfortunately, it is impossible to infer much from these
results because of the peculiarities of the wording in the
Radical Nullification Instruction. First, the instruction invites
jurors to bring in their "feelings," a wording which could convey
to some jurors that they were thus liberated not only from the
law and the evidence but also from reasonableness itself. The
instruction also fails to distinguish "feelings" derived from
conscience and those derived from the fact-finding that the jury
is charged to do. That is, the Radical Nullification Instruction
does not ensure that the fact-finding role of the jury remains
unchanged. Without any other accommodation in either the
instructions or the procedure, it would not be surprising for
juries to fail to pay attention to the evidence and to import
personal concerns into their fact-finding. The emphasis placed
on "feelings" in the Radical Nullification Instruction, without
some clearer delineation of the proper role for feelings in the
deliberation process, is problematic and potentially confusing.
Second, while the Radical Nullification Instruction informs
jurors that nothing will bar them from acquitting the defendant to avoid injustice, the instruction does not explicitly instructjurors that nullification may only benefit the defendant,
because the standard and burden of proof on the prosecution
does not change. 281 Thus, the Radical Nullification Instruction

278. Id. at 34.
279. Id. at 33-36.
280. See id. at 35.
281. See Scheflin, supra note 8, at 214-15; see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("In a criminal case, on the other hand, we do not
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leaves open the opportunity for, and arguably invites, a nullification conviction. Thus, this first Horowitz study might seem
to confirm the fears of the Court in Spar{ and Hansen, that a
jury given the widest possible latitude in finding the law may
just as likely make the law harsher as well as make it more
lenient. 282 Consequently, the first Horowitz study, by not
appreciating the unfortunate wording of the Radical Nullification Instruction and not introducing any other jury control
mechanisms, evidentiary counterweights, or nullification
arguments from the attorneys, did not put jury nullification to
a true test.
Horowitz's second study introduced a number of additional
factors into the discussion, thereby curing some but not all of
the defects from the earlier study. The three trials played
before the mock juries in the second study were the same
drunk-driving, vehicular homicide case and the euthanasia case
from the first study, as well as a new weapons possession
case. 283 In the second study, some mock juries heard the
standard instruction without nullification language, some
heard the Radical Nullification Instruction, and others heard
only nullification arguments by the defense lawyers. 284 Some
juries heard prosecutorial reminders in both the opening and
closing statements to follow the law regardless of personal
sentiments, and those same prosecutors objected to every
mention of nullification by the defense. 285 The judge, in suc"Q
instances, never overruled or sustained the State's objection,
but instead instructed the jurors that they might consider
these objections in their deliberations. 286
The results were more complex than those from the first
Horowitz study. First, the results demonstrated that nullification information affected deliberations regardless of whether
the information came from the bench by way of an instruction
or from the defense lawyer by way of an argument. 287 Second,

view the social disutility of convicting an innocent man as equivalent to the disutility
of acquitting someone who is guilty.... In this context, I view the requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental
value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than
to let a guilty man go free.").
282. See Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 101 (1894).
283. Horowitz, supra note 237, at 443.
284. Id. at 444.
285. Id. at 444-45.
286. Id. at 445.
287. Id. at 446.
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a defense attorney's nullification argument in the drunkdriving, vehicular homicide case resulted in more confident
guilty verdicts by the jury than if nullification was introduced
from the bench. 288 Third, objections by the prosecutor to the
nullification argument seemed to temper the juries' guilty
verdicts in the vehicular homicide case. 289 As in the first study,
juries who received nullification information, whether from the
judge or from the attorneys, spent less time deliberating the
evidence and more time deliberating characteristics of the
defendant, personal experiences, and general issues of justice.290 Again, the test of a nullification instruction or argument
on deliberation was weakened in the second study by the use
of the Radical Nullification Instruction.
Another problem with the Horowitz studies is that they did
not deal with the effect that a nullification instruction or
argument could have on the general instructions given to the
jury. To inject a nullification instruction into the judge's charge
without making adjustments to the other charges at odds with
it in order to clearly separate the issue of nullification from
fact-finding serves only to confuse the jury and weaken the
efficacy of all of the instructions.
For example, the standard instruction that identifies the
judge as the arbiter of the law and the jury as the arbiter of
the facts 291 is facially at odds with a nullification instruction,
unless in the instruction there is some accommodation or
procedural delineation of the jury's fact~finding role as separate
from the jury's ultimate determination of guilt or innocence.
Similarly, the standard instructions precluding a verdict based
on bias, prejudice, sympathy, whim, speculation, or a desire to
avoid a disagreeable duty, 292 require some adjustment, either
in the language or the procedure, so that jurors do not confuse
a finding of reasonable doubt based on conscience with a
finding ofreasonable doubt based on racial animus, guesswork,
or an elevation of the standard of proof to a metaphysical
certainty. 293

288. Id. at 450-51.
289. Id. at 446; see also Creagan, supra note 243, at 1140-44 (reviewing the Van
Dyke studies).
290. Horowitz, supra note 237, at 451-52.
291. See, e.g., 1 CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS NEW YORK No. 2.44, at 61 (1983)
[hereinafter CJI(NY)] ("Indictment Not Evidence"); 1 CJI(NY) No. 2.55, at 69 ("Jury
Exclusive Judges of Facts"); 1 CJI(NY) No. 3.25, at 112 ("Function of Court and Jury");
1 CJI(NY) No. 5.10, at 222 ("Function of Jury").
292. See, e.g., 1 CJI(NY) No. 2.53, at 67 ("Potential Racial Bias").
293. See, e.g., 1 CJI(NY) No. 6.20, at 248-50 ("Reasonable Doubt").
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The standard charge perhaps most dissonant with a nullification instruction is one that tells the jury not to consider the
subject ofpunishment. 294 Almost all nullification acquittals can
be reduced to one common judgment-that the defendant,
although technically guilty, should not be punished. The
reasoning underlying this phenomenon may differ, but in any
case, an instruction precluding jury consideration of punishment is inconsistent with a nullification instruction. Again, an
accotnmodation must be made, either by changing the language
or by clearly delineating the jury's fact-finding role from its
verdict obligation. Otherwise, the instruction does not empower
the members of the jury as much as it confuses them.
To avoid ambiguity, certain charges of general applicability
should be linked explicitly to the nullification instruction.
Those charges include (1) the reasonable doubt instruction,
which establishes the standard of proof required for a conviction, 295 and (2) the burden ofproofinstruction, which places the
burden of demonstrating guilt exclusively on the prosecution. 296
A nullification instruction affects both charges in that a
reasonable doubt could arise out of concepts of justice or
matters of conscience not explicitly charged by the judge.
Further, the power to nullify does not alter the prosecution's
burden or the high standard of proof required for conviction,
thus precluding a jury from convicting via nullification.

V.

THE PROPOSED CHARGE

In this Part we will propose a model nullification instruction.
We will also propose other reforms in the trial and deliberation
process which will more closely serve the dual purposes of jury
empowerment and rationality in r.eturning verdicts. These
reforms include changes to pre-trial notice requirements,
evidentiary rules, the judge's charge, and most significantly,
a bifurcated jury deliberation process in nullification cases.

294. See, e.g., 1 CJl(NY) No. 3.09, at 96-97 ("Jury Not to Consider Punishment");
1 CJl(NY) No. 6.30, at 255 ("Jury Not to Consider Punishment").
295. See, e.g., 1 CJl(NY) No. 6.20, at 248-50.
296. See, e.g., 1 CJl(NY) No. 6.05, at 244 ("Burden of Proof').
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A. Bifurcated Deliberation

An adequate jury nullification instruction must both empower the jury and provide for a rational deliberating process.
It must liberate but not confuse. It must work alongside other
charges of general applicability, not at cross-purposes with
these charges. With these goals in mind, we propose a bifurcated jury deliberation whenever a nullification instruction is
given in a criminal case. 297
After the attorneys' summations, the court should give the
case to the jury with the requested final instructions, adjusted
to accommodate the nullification charge and to eliminate
ambiguities. At this first stage, the court should make it clear
to the jury that this is but the first of two stages of deliberation
and fact-finding.
Once the jury has reached either a provisional verdict or an
impasse, 298 based solely on the applicability of the law to the
facts, only then should the jury be charged by the court to
consider whether or not justice demands an acquittal irrespective of its findings of fact. The purpose of this bifurcation
is to avoid the adverse· consequences of a nullification instruction given along with other instructions by isolating the
jury's two roles, fact-finding and verdict delivering.
Thus, the first stage of the bifurcated deliberation should be
similar to the usual jury deliberation in which the jury applies
the law received from the judge to the facts. The difference will
be that the jury will arrive at a provisional verdict, or a finding
of fact similar to a special verdict in a civil trial. 299 Unlike a
special verdict, however, which is impermissible in a criminal

297. See, e.g., David U. Strawn & G. Thomas Munsterman, Helping Juries Handle
Complex Cases, in IN THE JURY Box 180, 180-82 (Lawrence S. Wrightsman et al. eds.,
1987) (suggesting bifurcation to permit juries to handle complex cases more efficiently). Whereas a nullification case is not necessarily a complex case by way of complicated facts or legal theory, it is a case that invites confusion through the conflation
of the jury's fact-finding obligation with the jury's power to render a general,
unreviewable verdict. We believe that bifurcation provides the jury with a better
opportunity to isolate the issue of justice in a particular case from findings of facts
relating to the elements of the underlying crime.
298. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 310.60 (McKinney 1993) (allowing the court
to discharge a jury after the court determines that agreement is unlikely and each
party consents to such a discharge, or if the court declares a mistrial under§ 280.10).
299. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 49(a); N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. 4111(c) (McKinney
1993).
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trial, 300 the jury will not detail any explicit finding to the judge
other than "we have reached a verdict" or "we have an impasse." If the ju·ry reports that it has reached a verdict, the
court should instruct the following:
If your vote is unanimously not guilty at this stage, then
your deliberations are essentially over. You should return
to the jury room to take a final vote to confirm your not
guilty verdict. If, on the other hand, your vote is unanimously guilty on the facts as governed by the law as I have
instructed you at this stage, you must return to the jury
room for a second deliberation to determine whether, as a
matter of conscience, these circumstances present the
extraordinary situation where a verdict of guilty will result
in an injustice of such magnitude that the defendant should
be acquitted notwithstanding your provisional finding of
guilt.
You are the jury, and by that, you are the final authority
to decide whether or not to apply a given law to the alleged
acts of the defendant on trial in this case. As jurors, you
are representatives of the community, and as such, it is
appropriate for you to bring into your deliberations the
community's concept of justice and your own deeply felt
ideas about justice based on conscience. To that end, if you
think that applying the law in the particular circumstances
before you and convicting the defendant of some or all of
the crimes charged would produce an inequitable or unjust
result, then you may acquit the defendant, notwithstanding
any findings of fact you may have already made as to the
guilt or innocence of the defendant. Such a vote of not
guilty is unreviewable by this or any other court.

300. Unlike the civil rules, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not provide
for a special verdict or special interrogatories. But see FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(c) (mentioning special provisions permitting such findings during bench trials).
In addition, special verdicts have been held to be error in a number of federal
criminal cases. See, e.g., United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 180-81 (1st Cir. 1969);
Gray v. United States, 174 F.2d 919, 923 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 848 (1949).
The courts have held special verdicts impermissible in criminal cases largely because
such an imposition from the bench infringes on the jury's right to deliberate free from
legal fetters. See Spock, 416 F.2d at 180-83. Interrogatories interfere with the jury's
power to arrive at a general verdict without having to support the verdict with reasons
or a report of the jury's deliberations. Id. Most importantly, interrogatories and special
verdicts abridge the jury's power to follow or choose not to follow the judge's charge.
See id. at 181.
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Again, at this second stage of deliberation, your verdict
of not guilty must be unanimous. If only five or less of you
vote not guilty during this second stage, then you should
ultimately return a guilty verdict based upon your findings
during your first stage of deliberations. However, if six or
more of you vote not guilty at this second stage of deliberations, then report to me that you are at an impasse. You
may now return to your deliberations. 301
The same procedure should apply when the jury has reached
an impasse after the first stage of deliberation. 302 The same
instruction should be given for a hung jury at the second stage
as for a jury which has unanimously found factual guilt, less
the language reflecting that the jury is deadlocked on the facts.
If the jury reached an impasse after the first stage and remains at an impasse after the second stage, then a mistrial is
in order ifthe parties do not consent to a discharge of the jury.
However, if the jury has made a unanimous finding of guilt
at the first stage, then a verdict of not guilty notwithstanding
301. Much of the wording of our suggested instruction incorporates language from
other proposed pattern instructions. Cf legislative bills cited supra note 245 (discussing proposals in various states to instruct the jury of its authority to consider equity
and conscience in reaching its verdict).
302. If the jury reports that it has reached an impasse at the first stage, i.e., that
it is unable to agree on a finding of factual guilt or non-guilt, the judge should then
instruct the following:
You have indicated to me that you cannot reach a unanimous decision as to the
guilt or innocence of the defendant on the facts as governed by the law as I have
instructed you. Accordingly, I direct that you return to the jury room for a
second deliberation to determine whether as a matter of conscience, these
circumstances present the extraordinary situation where a verdict of not guilty
will result in a better administration of justice despite the fact that some of you
believe that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime
charged.
You are the jury, and by that, you are the final authority to decide whether
or not to apply a given law to the alleged acts of the defendant on trial in this
case. As jurors, you are representatives of the community, and as such, it is
appropriate for you to bring into your deliberations the community's concept of
. justice and your own deeply felt ideas about justice based on conscience. To that
end, if you think that applying the law in the particular circumstances before
you and convicting the defendant of some or all of the crimes charged would
produce an inequitable or unjust result, then you may vote to acquit the
defendant, notwithstanding any findings offact you may have already made as
to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Such a vote of not guilty is unreviewable by this or any other court.
Again, at this second stage of deliberation, your verdict of not guilty must be
unanimous. If it is not unanimous, then you must report to me that you are at
an impasse again. You may now return to your deliberations.
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factual guilt at the second stage must also be unanimous, and
a minority vote of not guilty at the second stage should be
insufficient to hang the jury. In other words, if a unanimous
jury makes a factual finding of guilt at the first stage, a guilty
verdict will stand unless, notwithstanding factual guilt, at least
six jurors in a twelve-person jury vote not guilty at the second
stage. 303 If six or more jurors vote to nullify but the jury falls
short of unanimous agreement, then an impasse and a mistrial
should be declared. A unanimous vote of not-guilty notwithstanding factual guilt is the only vote sufficient to permit a
verdict of not-guilty once the second stage has been reached.
To avoid the criticisms of a special verdict in criminal trials, 304
none of these deliberations should be reported to the judge. No
doubt, such a procedure at the second stage places additional
burdens on the jury foreperson in charge of the deliberation
process, but this procedure is no more difficult or cumbersome
than any number of instructions and procedures that juries
now are expected to follow. 305
The purpose behind requiring a non-minority vote of acquittal at the second stage in order to hang a jury that had
unanimously found factual guilt is to emphasize the importance of the first stage deliberations and the resultant findings.
A decision to nullify a previous finding of guilt according to law
should not be viewed casually. Whereas the first stage requires
unanimity as a jury control protection against an improper
verdict based on improper fact-finding, 306 the second stage
requires a balancing of interests not under explicit consideration during the first stage. At the second stage, the jury has
been expressly instructed that it is empowered to acquit in
spite of the law as charged by the judge and irrespective of the
law as it pertains to the facts found during the first stage of
deliberations. With evidence of guilt established at the first
stage, it is proper to require something more than a single vote

303. The formula for declaring impasse or referring back to the original finding
of factual guilt is based on a 12-person jury model. Not all states try crimes with a
12-personjury. Thus, with a 6-personjury, the number of votes required to constitute
an impasse at the second stage should be half that required to hang a 12-personjury,
or 3-not-guilty votes.
304. See supra note 300.
305. See, e.g., Strawn & Munsterman, supra note 297, at 180-83 (suggesting an
instruction to the jury to deliberate issues in a complex case sequentially).
306. See David A. Vollrath & James H. Davis, Jury Size and Decision Rule, in THE
JURY: ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 73-106 (Rita J. Simon ed., 1980) (discussing
unanimity and non-unanimity requirements in jury trials).
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for nullification by a single juror to create an impasse at the
second stage. 307 The purposes of a jury nullification instruction
must be to empower the jury and to provide rational process.
Once a jury has made a unanimous finding of fact according
to law, rational process requires that the power of a jury to
disaffirm that finding must be itself the product of some
measure of consensus, not merely the caprice of one person or
a small number of people.

B. The Notice Requirement and Evidentiary Parameters
Bifurcation of the deliberation process is the primary means
by which rational process would be achieved in our proposed
system. However, it is not and cannot be the only means. For
example, the prosecutor's objections and arguments against
nullification strongly influence the jury. 308 This is as it should
be. Rational process and full deliberation require not only that
the nullification power be made explicit but also that the contrary position be explored fully as well. The only way to make
sure that the jury's verdict is the product of deeply felt ideas
about justice is to put those ideas to the test of controversy. In
this regard, a defendant's request for a nullification charge
necessarily opens the door to a nullification case itself. 309
Thus, as a matter of procedure, the prosecution must be given adequate opportunity to try its counternullification case. A
sufficient opportunity requires pre-trial notice, much like a
notice of an alibi310 or a non-responsibility defense. 311 Notice
would not only inform the prosecution of the defense's intention
to request a nullification charge but also provide a brief

307. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 377 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring)
(discussing juror "irrationality" and decision rules).
308. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
309. The concept of "opening the door" to what ordinarily would be inadmissible
evidence is a familiar concept to criminal trial lawyers. For instance, Rule 405 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence permits the admission of testimony relating to character
traits and reputation evidence. The scope of cross-examination, however, expands commensurately into inquiry of specific instances of conduct that might shed a contrary
light on character. In other words, when the defense puts its good character at issue,
the defense opens the door to bad character evidence.
310. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 250.20 (McKinney 1993).
311. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 250.10 (McKinney 1993).
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description of the content of the defense itself. 312 For example,
if such a procedural requirement had been in place during the
Leroy Reed gun possession case, 313 the defense attorney would
have given notice of the defendant's diminished intelligence
and illiteracy, his lack of blameworthiness in purchasing the
gun, and his ignorance both the law and of the requirements
of his parole to the prosecution before trial in order to afford
the prosecution the opportunity to investigate and prepare its
case.
The notice requirement should not be construed as burdenshifting to the disadvantage of the defendant. If the defendant
wishes to try a nullification defense without putting the
prosecution on notice, it could do so in the form of argument.
The only problem the defense will encounter is that the court
will not provide a nullification instruction, and the judge may
rule more strictly on legal relevancy, thus precluding some of
the defendant's evidence. On the other hand, adherence to the
notice requirement will not lock the defendant into a nullification defense. If the defendant chooses at the last minute to
assert a more standard defense and does not open the door to
nullification issues before the jury, then the scope of the
prosecution's case remains the same as it would be otherwise.
The scope of the prosecution's case expands only when the
defense opens the door to counternullification by putting forth
facts and arguments clearly aimed at creating a defense beyond
the bounds of positive law. This result requires some care on
the part of the defense, because mere mention of the nullification argument, even during voir dire questioning, may serve
to open the door.
Finally, bifurcation will not place additional burdens upon
the defense. Defense attorneys are accustomed to cautious
toeing of the evidentiary line in order to avoid raising certain
issues. For example, they must raise character and propensity
issues cautiously because of the risk that they will open the
door to the admission of prior bad acts or negative personal
traits. 314 Defense counsel take similar care to avoid questioning
police conduct when it might open the door to otherwise

312. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 250.20 (requiring the defendant to provide a list
of the places where the defendant claims to have been at the time of the crime and
a list of witnesses to corroborate the alibi).
313. See supra Part II.A.
314. See FED. R. Evm. 404(a)(l).
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inadmissible and prejudicial evidence that would rehabilitate
the police witness or explain the officer's conduct.

CONCLUSION

A nullification instruction and a bifurcated deliberation that
separate fact-finding from the issues of conscience which might
prevail notwithstanding factual guilt, along with the pre-trial
procedural and evidentiary adjustments discussed, will serve
the dual requirements needed for informed nullification. Such
an instruction must communicate in a relatively simple and
straightforward manner the power that the jury has to acquit
in spite of a clear violation of criminal law. The instruction and
the related procedures must also create a process by which that
power will be exercised thoughtfully-through a process that
encourages true deliberation rather than confusion, caprice, or
bad faith.
Implementation of such procedures will not necessarily make
trial procedure more efficient. It probably will not diminish the
length of most trials and may even lengthen others. It will do
very little for clogged court calendars and overcrowded jails.
But it will enhance integrity in the jury's work. Instead of
nullifying the judge's instructions by focusing on surrogate
issues, such as lack of mens rea, or raising the standard of
proof, the jury will be given the opportunity to consider directly
the issue of justice. Direct consideration will in turn produce
verdicts that better satisfy the jury and society, not because ·
the results will be any different than they would be otherwise,
but because they will be verdicts deriving from informed
discussion. The jury will understand its power and have a
procedural structure that will encourage it to use that power
rationally, carefully, and deliberately.
·
The recent examples of jury nullification add little to the
history of jury verdicts nor signal fundamental changes in the
character of the American jury. What has changed, through
media focus, is the degree to which the public experiences the
nullification phenomenon. More importantly, the political
conclusions that interpretations of recent verdicts have
spawned are based upon information that is neither complete
nor informed.
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A carefully crafted nullification instruction and deliberation
procedure will help accomplish a number of salutary purposes,
including increasing the availability of information on how
juries deliberate. It will also rationalize jury decision making
by allowing the jury to discuss issues of justice and mercy
without forcing them to deliberate these issues covertly
through the use of surrogates disguised as fact-finding. To that
end, this Article advocates a bifurcated deliberation procedure
that clearly separates the fact-finding task from the justicedispensing function of the jury, both for the jury's sake and for
the sake of a society that desires rational process in its courts.
Moreover, a pattern nullification instruction and deliberation
procedure will further empower communities, particularly
those which are poor and disenfranchised, to exercise direct
and immediate oversight over government action. In that way,
it will strengthen the respect for the jury process and the
criminal justice system in communities that are currently
estranged from their government by giving societal recognition
to the right of ordinary citizens to exercise discretion on law
enforcement.
Finally, although defendants will be free to pursue a nullification defense without an instruction, this Article proposes
that, in order to receive a nullification instruction, defendants
must give notice to the ·prosecution to prepare a counter
nullification case, to address issues of relevancy during the
trial, and to impose a cost upon the defendant electing to
pursue such an extraordinary defense and jury instruction.
In the final analysis, we need juries to deliberate honestly
and openly, not just because society learns from their decisions,
but also because juries in essence are the last deliberative body
of grassroots decision making.· As Professor Abramson writes,
"only the jury still regularly calls upon ordinary citizens to
engage each other in a face-to-face process of debate."315
We vote alone and in secret. Our elected officials do not
always engage in principled discussion about issues, sometimes
preferring to talk in sound-bites and to jostle each other for
large contributions to their war chests. The judiciary is removed from our direct influence by design. Ordinary citizens,
particularly those who are poor and without political power,
are increasingly alienated from the process of government and
feel increasingly forgotten by it. In the absence of the early

315.

ABRAMSON, supra note 112, at 8.
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colonial town meetings where citizens were able to participate
directly in government, the jury remains the only institution
through which ordinary citizens know that their voices and
votes still count. Indeed, "the jury is the last, best refuge of
this connection among democracy, deliberation, and the
achievement of wisdom by ordinary persons."316 Consequently,
rationalizing the jury deliberation process helps to restore our
sense that, in some arena of governance, purposeful selfdel usion need no longer be the norm.

POSTSCRIPT

At the time that this Article was completed, the trial of O.J.
Simpson317 was still in progress. We did not discuss the case
because any speculation as to whether jury nullification might
have been at play would clearly have been premature. Now
that the jury has returned a unanimous verdict of acquittal,
some perceive the Simpson verdict as illustrative of jury
nullification. 318 Although it is impossible to make confident
conclusions from post-trial juror statements, we believe that
the wide extent of the speculation about it is illustrative of the
confusion now surrounding the meaning of jury verdicts and
the issue of jury nullification. Whereas there was extensive
speculation of nullification in the Simpson case, despite the
ample evidence to indicate that the jury did not nullify, nullification was relatively undiscussed in cases involving "abuse
excuse" defenses, where nullification could have been, in fact,
at work. 319
While we offer no comprehensive analysis of the Simpson
verdict we note several striking aspects about it. There is much
basis to believe that juror doubts were not grounded in
Simpson's celebrity status or race so much as in mistrust of the

316. Id. at 11.
317. People v. Simpson, No. B3BA097211 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 1995).
318. See, e.g., Laura Mansnerus, Under Fire, Jury System Faces Overhaul, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 1995, at L9 (quoting Greg Totten, the executive director of the
California District Attorneys Association as stating "Simpson does illustrate vividly
the problem of jury nullification").
319. See supra Part II.
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prosecution's evidence, 320 the credibility of the prosecution's
witnesses, 321 and the prosecution's theory of the case. 322 Indeed,
particularly telling was one juror's post-verdict, gnawing
suspicion of Simpson's guilt. In that regard, she stated, "[I]fwe
made a mistake, I would rather it be a mistake on the side of
a person's innocence than the other way." 323 When she had expressed her doubt to several other jurors, she reported that
they cried and remarked that" '[m]aybe the laws need to be
changed to remove the reasonable doubt.' "324 These anecdotes
indicate a jury taking seriously the presumption of innocence,
the standard of proof, andthe policy that undergirds both due
process protections-that we as a society would rather occasionally acquit the guilty to ensure that we have a system that
does not convict the innocent.
In addition, the Simpson jury seemed to have been listening
to the judge's instructions of general applicability rather than
disregarding them. One of the instructions charged:
[A] witness who is willfully false in one material part of his
or her testimony is to be distrusted in others. You may
reject the whole testimony of a witness who has willfully
testified falsely as to a material point unless from all the

320. Brenda Moran, the first juror to make a public statement, indicated doubts
about whether the bloody glove fit on Simpson, Larry King Live, Transcript #1556
(CNN television Broadcast, Oct. 4, 1995) (transcript at 8, on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), and possible crime lab blood preservative on
evidence supposedly found at the crime scene, Larry King Live, Transcript 1558 (CNN
television broadcast, Oct. 6, 1995) (transcript at 6, on file with the University of
Michigan Journal ofLaw Reform). Anice Aschenbach, a white juror who initially voted
for guilt in the first jury poll, also thought the DNA evidence was "shaky." Prime Time
Live, Transcript #422 (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 4, 1994) (transcript at 1, on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
321. Aschenbach stated that it was "possible that the [bloody glove) was planted"
by Detective Fuhrman at Simpson's estate. She expressed that she largely discounted
Fuhrman's testimony because of the detective's virulent racism and previous perjury,
as well as doubted the credibility of the lead detective in the Simpson investigation.
Prime Time Live, Transcript #422, supra note 320 (transcript at 1).
322. Alternate juror Walter Watson Calhoun stated his doubts about the time line
presented by the prosecution. He stated that to him "the key moment was the time
element of-that they allotted Mr. Simpson to change his clothes, get rid of a weapon,
clean himself up, and all those things a murderer would have to do, it was impossible
for him to do it in five minutes." Larry King Live, Transcript #1556, supra note 320
(transcript at 9).
323. Prime Time Live, Transcript #422, supra note 320 (transcript at 2).
324. Id.
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evidence you believe the probability of truth favors his or
her testimony in other particulars . . . .325
Such a strong instruction as to witness credibility, combined
with the strong emphasis by both sides on the police witness'
credibility, or lack of it, was apparently devastating to the
prosecution. While the underlying tensions between the Los
Angeles African American community and the Los Angeles
Police Department may have been at work with regard to how
the police testimony was received by the Simpson jury, the
judge's instruction, in effect, invited them to disregard all the
testimony of the police witnesses. Thus, no importation of
general and extralegal antipolice sentiment was necessary for
the jury to discount the police testimony. Indeed, the evidence
suggests that the Simpson jury listened to Judge Ito very
carefully.

325. 0.J. Unofficial Transcript 10:19 a.m.-11:33 a.m. (Pacific), Sept. 22, 1995,
available in Westlaw, OJ-Update Database.

